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Abstract
Using a sample of 2,200 households representative of the US population and a sam-
ple of more than 1,000 experts, we measure beliefs about how aggregate unemploy-
ment and inflation respond to different macroeconomic shocks. Expert predictions
are quantitatively close to standard DSGE models and VAR evidence. While house-
holds’ beliefs are directionally aligned with those of experts in the case of oil supply
shocks and government spending shocks, they predict an opposite reaction of infla-
tion to monetary policy and income tax shocks. A substantial fraction of deviations
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1 Introduction
A core assumption underlying rational expectations macroeconomic models is that eco-
nomic agents form expectations about aggregate outcomes that are consistent with the
underlying model. For instance, standard New Keynesian models predict increases in
both unemployment and inflation in response to a negative supply-side shock, but an in-
crease in unemployment and a decrease in inflation in response to a negative demand-side
shock. Households are assumed to recognize these relationships and form their expecta-
tions accordingly. In this paper, we study empirically people’s beliefs about the response
of inflation and unemployment to different types of macroeconomic shocks.
Characterizing households’ subjective models in the context of macroeconomic shocks
not only sheds light on a crucial assumption underlying macroeconomic models, but is also
important to better understand how households form expectations about unemployment
and inflation. Recent evidence indicates that these expectations matter for households’
consumption and financial decisions, and thereby shape aggregate outcomes (Armona et
al., 2018; Bailey et al., 2019, 2018; Coibion et al., 2019a,c; D’Acunto et al., 2019a; Kuch-
ler and Zafar, 2019). Understanding households’ beliefs about macroeconomic shocks is
also essential to assess the effects of government and central bank policies, as the im-
pact of such policies depends on households’ forward-looking expectations of aggregate
dynamics. Indeed, some of these policies, such as monetary forward guidance, aim to
influence people’s behavior primarily by shifting macroeconomic expectations (Coibion
et al., 2018b).
Measuring households’ beliefs about changes in inflation and unemployment in re-
sponse to macroeconomic shocks poses several challenges. First, it is difficult to find
clean exogenous variation in beliefs about the likelihood of macroeconomic shocks in the
real world. Second, people’s beliefs should be measured in a way that enables a compari-
son with benchmarks from the theoretical and empirical literature. Third, beliefs should
be measured using survey questions that are understandable to individuals without an
economics education.
We propose an approach to measure beliefs about the effects of different macroeco-
nomic shocks, which we apply to a representative sample of 2,200 individuals of the US
population. We use vignettes in which we ask our respondents to predict future unem-
ployment and inflation under different hypothetical macroeconomic shocks. We focus on
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four different exogenous shocks that are among the most commonly studied in macroeco-
nomics: an oil supply shock, a monetary policy shock, a government spending shock, and
an income tax shock. Our approach allows us to fix the respondents’ beliefs about the
sources of the shocks and to ensure that the shocks are perceived as exogenous. This en-
ables us to compare our respondents’ beliefs to benchmarks from theoretical models and
empirical evidence. Moreover, we conduct the same survey with a sample of more than
1,000 experts from academia, policy institutions and the private sector. This provides us
with another benchmark that does not rely on any particular model or piece of empirical
evidence. In addition, the expert survey allows us to compare economists’ beliefs about
the functioning of the US economy with the predictions of standard models and empirical
evidence.
For each vignette, we elicit the respondents’ expectations about the unemployment
rate and the inflation rate twice: First, under a hypothetical scenario in which the shock
variable of interest, such as the oil price, will not change over the next 12 months; sec-
ond, under a “rise-scenario” or a “fall-scenario” to which the respondents are randomly
allocated. In the “rise-scenario”, the shock variable of interest increases relative to the
baseline scenario. For example, in the oil price vignette, we tell our respondents that the
oil price will be on average $30 higher over the next 12 months or, in the income tax
vignette, that tax rates increase by 1 percentage point. In the “fall-scenario”, the shock
variable of interest decreases relative to the baseline scenario. By taking the difference
in the predictions of unemployment and inflation between the rise/fall and the baseline
scenario we measure each respondent’s beliefs about effects of the shock, while taking out
constant differences in expectations across individuals.
We first present the predictions from the experts. Experts think that both inflation
and unemployment positively respond to an increase in oil prices. Experts forecast that
unemployment responds positively to increases in taxes and to decreases in government
spending, while inflation responds negatively. Finally, experts think that inflation drops
in response to interest rate hikes, while unemployment increases. The experts’ forecasts
are all precisely estimated and largely consistent with predictions from DSGE models and
empirical evidence from VARs. Moreover, there is relatively little disagreement among
the experts.
We next compare the expert predictions to those of respondents from the representa-
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tive online panel. The respondents in this sample hold very similar beliefs as the experts
in the oil vignette, both for unemployment and inflation. While households think that
inflation positively responds to changes in government spending, they on average do not
think that unemployment significantly responds to changes in government spending. The
most striking deviation from the experts’ forecasts is that households think that increases
in the federal funds target rate would increase inflation, as would a rise in income tax
rates. Across the vignettes, households’ predictions about the unemployment rate are
largely aligned with those of experts, while their inflation forecasts are less in line with
those of experts. These findings suggest that the assumption that households form ex-
pectations in line with equilibrium relationships of standard macroeconomic models may
serve as a reasonable approximation in some contexts, but not always. Finally, there is a
large degree of heterogeneity in household beliefs, consistent with models of learning in
which households may disagree about the structural parameters of the economy.
What is driving the deviations of household predictions from the benchmarks? We
include a series of tailored questions that allow us to study the mechanisms behind our
findings. We begin by measuring our respondents’ beliefs about the propagation mecha-
nisms of macroeconomic shocks. Holding more accurate beliefs about propagation chan-
nels positively correlates with making predictions that are qualitatively aligned with those
of experts, but the effects are relatively moderate. Moreover, respondents’ evaluation of
how relevant aggregate unemployment or inflation are to their own economic situation
is uncorrelated with how close their predictions are to the benchmarks. Furthermore,
deviations of households’ predictions from those of experts about the inflation response
to interest rate and tax shocks are not purely driven by households who believe in greater
importance of a cost channel, suggesting that our findings do not operate through house-
holds holding a supply-side view of the economy. Among respondents’ demographic
characteristics, higher education and age are associated with predictions that are more
in line with those of experts, providing some support for learning over the life-cycle and
cognitive constraints (D’Acunto et al., 2019b,c,d).
Research from psychology and economics emphasizes that individuals revert to simple
heuristics in complex decision environments that are plagued by a large degree of uncer-
tainty (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Lacetera et al., 2012). Building on these insights, we
propose a behavioral channel based on respondents’ affective representation of macroe-
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conomic variables, which we term the “good-bad heuristic” (GBH). The GBH posits that
individuals perceiving two variables as both good (or both bad) predict that these vari-
ables move in the same direction, while, if they perceive one variable as good and the
other as bad, they predict movement in opposing directions. For each variable of interest,
we measure whether respondents consider higher values of the variable as good or bad
for their own household and for the US economy. We find that a substantial fraction of
deviations from benchmarks can be explained by the GBH, consistent with an important
role for sentiment in expectation formation (Kamdar, 2018). These findings call for more
theoretical and empirical work featuring a role for economic agents’ affective judgment
in shaping their macroeconomic expectations.
Finally, we illustrate the potential implications of our findings in a simple quantitative
exercise. We show that households’ partial-equilibrium responses to monetary policy
shocks are substantially altered if their inflation and unemployment expectations are in
line with our evidence. This indicates that heterogeneity in beliefs can have important
implications for the transmission mechanism of policies. Moreover, our findings highlight
the importance of adequate communication of specific policy measures to the public
(Blinder et al., 2008; Coibion et al., 2019b; Haldane and McMahon, 2018).
We build on a growing literature studying the formation of macroeconomic expec-
tations of experts, households and firms (Acosta and Afrouzi, 2019; Afrouzi, 2019; Ar-
mantier et al., 2016, 2015; Bachmann et al., 2019, 2015; Binder and Rodrigue, 2018;
Binder and Makridis, 2018; Bordalo et al., 2018, 2019; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion and
Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015a,b; Fuster et al., 2012, 2010, 2019; Goldfayn-Frank and Wohl-
fart, 2019; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016). We contribute to this research effort by
providing the first direct evidence on households’ beliefs about the effects of macroeco-
nomic shocks.
Our paper is related to work studying beliefs about the relationship between different
macroeconomic variables. Carvalho and Nechio (2014), Dräger et al. (2016) and Kuchler
and Zafar (2019) use observational data to examine how households’ beliefs about unem-
ployment, inflation and interest rates are correlated. A series of experiments have studied
cross-learning, i.e. how respondents update their expectations about unemployment in
response to information about inflation (Coibion et al., 2019a, 2018a, 2019c), and how
they update their expectations about inflation in response to learning about the likelihood
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of a recession (Roth and Wohlfart, 2019). While the exogenous variation in information
in these experiments allows for causal identification, the interpretation of cross-learning
is difficult as beliefs about the source of changes in inflation and GDP growth are unre-
stricted. Our approach directly measures households’ beliefs about the effects of different
exogenous macroeconomic shocks, and therefore allows us to characterize how well beliefs
about the response of inflation and unemployment align with theoretical and empirical
benchmarks.1
We methodologically contribute to the literature on macroeconomic expectation for-
mation by proposing the use of hypothetical vignettes to characterize people’s subjective
beliefs about the responses of unemployment and inflation to different macroeconomic
shocks. A series of recent papers uses hypothetical vignettes to study belief formation
and behavior in contexts that are difficult to study in a real-world setting, such as in
the area of education and human capital (Delavande and Zafar, 2018; Wiswall and Zafar,
2017), and recently also for the study of the consumption response to changes in current
or expected future economic resources (Christelis et al., 2017; Fuster et al., 2018). We
contribute to this literature by applying this approach to study household beliefs about
changes in unemployment and inflation in response to commonly modelled shocks. We
also test for the role of effort by providing a random subset of respondents with prediction
incentives, leveraging expert responses as an external benchmark. We find that incen-
tives only moderately affect the predictions. Finally, our evidence on the predictions from
experts and the representative sample contributes to a literature studying differences in
forecasts between experts and the general population (DellaVigna and Pope, 2018a,b).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
samples of households and experts and the survey design. Section 3 presents our main
evidence on experts’ and households’ predictions in the different vignettes and compares
them to benchmarks from standard DSGE models and VARs. Section 4 discusses a series
of mechanisms that could be driving heterogeneity in household predictions. Section 5
provides evidence on the robustness of our results. Section 6 discusses the implications of
our findings for the transmission of shocks, macroeconomic modeling and policymaking.
Section 7 concludes.
1This also relates to a small literature providing causal evidence on misspecified mental models in
tightly controlled abstract prediction tasks, and on sources of model misspecification (Graeber, 2019).
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2 Data and Design
2.1 Samples
Representative samples We collect a sample of 2,200 respondents that is representa-
tive of the US population in terms of education, gender, age, region, and total household
income in two waves. We conducted the first wave of the online survey in February
and March 2019 in collaboration with the market research company Research Now SSI,
which is commonly used in economics. In July 2019, we collected the second wave in
collaboration with a widely used online panel provider, Lucid.
Table A2 provides summary statistics for the pooled sample and compares it to the
general population using data from the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS). Our
sample matches the distributions of education, gender, age, region and total household
income very closely. 55 percent of our respondents are female, compared to 51 percent in
the ACS. The average age in our sample is 46.4, while it is 47.4 in the ACS. 32 percent of
the respondents in our sample have at least a bachelor’s degree compared to 30 percent in
the ACS. The median income in our sample is $62,500 compared to $65,700 in the ACS.
Expert samples We recruited a sample of approximately 1,100 experts. In the first
wave, which took place in February and March 2019, we invited economists who were au-
thors or discussants in at least one of a series of leading conferences on macroeconomics.2
In addition, we invited Ph.D. students, experts from several policy institutions, as well
as several experts working in the broader areas of expectation formation and macroeco-
nomic forecasting. In total, 179 experts completed the first wave of the survey.3 We also
included our own module in the World Economic Survey (WES) conducted by the ifo
Institute (experts Wave 2). Their sample comprises about 1,800 economic experts from
around the world who make forecasts about the economic prospects of their country on a
quarterly basis (Boumans and Garnitz, 2017). The relevant survey round was conducted
in July 2019 and 908 experts completed at least one hypothetical vignette.4
As shown in Table A3, 16% percent of the experts that participated in Wave 1 are
from policy institutions, such as the IMF and central banks, and 83 percent of the experts
2For details on the conferences considered, see Appendix E.
3Demographic data on the 179 experts were collected directly from their CVs. For respondents from
PhD programs and policy institutions we asked a few questions on demographics at the end of the survey.
4743 out of the 908 experts responded to all questions in the survey.
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are from academic institutions. Moreover, only 26 percent of the experts are female. 21
percent are Full Professor, while 18 percent are PhD students.
In Wave 2 of our expert survey, 16 percent of experts are from policy institutions, 56%
from academia, 16 percent work in a bank or a company, while the remaining 12 percent
have another type of employer. The field of study of most of the experts is economics
(84 percent). 65 percent of the experts have a PhD, and they predominantly come from
North America or Western Europe (50 percent).5
2.2 Structure of the survey
Representative sample The structure of our survey with the representative sample
is summarized in Figure 1. First, our respondents complete a series of demographic
questions. Second, they receive brief non-technical definitions of the unemployment rate
and the inflation rate to establish a common-ground definition of the two terms at the
start of the survey. We also inform the respondents about the current values of the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the US to ensure comparable information
sets about the current state of the economy across respondents. Third, in the main part
of the survey participants make predictions about unemployment and inflation under
two hypothetical vignettes. Fourth, we ask additional questions to better understand
the mechanisms driving our respondents’ predictions. Finally, we collect data on some
additional demographics. The full set of experimental instructions for Wave 1 and Wave
2 of the experiments can be found under the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/
s/tovmpbqhp0xm9pq/instructions_subjectivemodels.pdf?dl=0.
Expert survey The expert survey consists of a subset of the survey given to the general
population (see Figure 1). After being introduced to the question format, experts directly
proceed to the prediction task in two randomly selected vignettes. At the end, experts
respond to a few demographic questions.6,7
5In Wave 2 of our survey we have slightly different descriptives due to the specific demographic
questions posed by the World Economic Survey.
6In Wave 1, PhD students and experts from policy institutions responded to the demographic ques-
tions. We obtained demographic information for academics from their websites.
7We do not include the definitions of inflation and unemployment, but still provide the experts with




To measure our respondents’ beliefs about the effects of different macroeconomic shocks,
we use hypothetical vignettes in which we introduce our respondents to different scenar-
ios and ask them to predict future unemployment and inflation. This approach allows
us to fix people’s beliefs about the source and the parameters of the shock and, impor-
tantly, to ensure that our respondents understand that the shocks are truly exogenous.
The vignettes focus on four different exogenous shocks which are among the most com-
monly studied in macroeconomics: an oil supply shock, a government spending shock,
a monetary policy shock, and a tax shock. Our participants are randomly assigned to
make predictions for two out of four different hypothetical vignettes that are presented
in random order.8
Each vignette follows the same structure (summarized in Figure 1). All start with
a short introduction to familiarize respondents with the setting of the vignette and the
variable that will be subject to the shock (a). For example, in the income tax vignette
they are informed about the average tax rate and the amount that the median house-
hold currently pays in taxes on labor income. Then, respondents are presented with a
baseline scenario in which they are asked to imagine that the variable of interest does
not change (b). In this scenario, we elicit people’s expectations about the unemployment
rate in 12 months from now and the inflation rate over the next 12 months. Our re-
spondents are then randomly assigned to either a “rise-scenario” or a “fall-scenario” (c).
In the “rise-scenario” (“fall-scenario”), respondents predict unemployment and inflation
under a hypothetical increase (decrease) of the shock variable of interest. Eliciting beliefs
under both a baseline as well as a rise/fall scenario allows us to measure beliefs about the
effects of shocks by taking differences across the scenarios. Thereby, constant individual-
level differences in expectations about the future level of unemployment and inflation are
cancelled out. Moreover, this leverages the behavioral phenomenon of “coherent arbi-
trariness” according to which statements about levels are often arbitrary and susceptible
to ephemeral influences such as framing or anchoring, whereas differences between stated
levels are comparatively coherent, robust, and reliable (Ariely et al., 2003). At the end of
each vignette, respondents are asked how confident they are about their unemployment
8In Wave 2 of the expert survey we did not fully randomize the order of vignettes as this is not
feasible in the World Economic Survey.
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and inflation predictions for the vignette on five-point scales (d).
Respondents indicate the expected unemployment and inflation rates on two sliders
that range from 0% to 10% for unemployment and from -2% to 8% for inflation. The
default position of the sliders is the current value of the respective rate. The sliders ease
the task for our respondents and reduce noise and cognitive strain. Finally, to account for
potential order effects, we cross-randomize whether respondents first receive the questions
on the inflation rate or the questions on the unemployment rate. For each participant,
the order of the inflation and unemployment questions is identical across all vignettes. In
what follows, we provide details on the vignettes.
Oil supply shock In the introduction to the oil vignette, respondents learn about
the current average price of one barrel of crude oil. Then, in the baseline scenario, our
respondents are told to imagine that the average price of crude oil stays constant over
the next 12 months. Thereafter, they are randomly assigned to either an “oil price rise
scenario” or an “oil price fall scenario”. Specifically, respondents in the “oil price rise
scenario” receive the following instructions:
Imagine the average price of crude oil unexpectedly rises due to problems with
the local production technology in the Middle East. On average, the price will
be $30 higher for the next 12 months than the current price. That is, the price
will be on average $84 for the next 12 months.
As is the case for all other vignettes, instructions for the fall-scenario are analogous to
the rise-scenario.
Government spending shock This vignette first provides respondents with informa-
tion on the size of yearly government spending in the US and its usual growth rate. In the
baseline scenario, our respondents are told to imagine that federal government spending
grows as usual over the next 12 months. In the “rise-scenario”, our respondents receive
the following instructions:
Imagine federal government spending unexpectedly grows to a larger extent
than usual over the next 12 months due to a newly announced spending
program on defense. In particular, total government spending grows by 2.4
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percentage points more than the usual growth that took place in the previous
years.
The government announces: The change is temporary and occurs despite
no changes in the government’s assessment of national security or economic
conditions. Moreover, federal taxes do not change in response to the spending
program.
Monetary policy shock We familiarize respondents with the federal funds target rate
and its current value. The baseline scenario asks our respondents to imagine that the
Federal Open Market Committee announces that it will keep the federal funds target
rate constant. In the subsequent “fall-scenario” our respondents receive the following
instructions:
Imagine the federal funds target rate is unexpectedly 0.5 percentage points
lower. That is, in its next meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee
announces that it is reducing the rate from 2.5% to 2%.
Imagine the committee announces it does so with no changes in their assess-
ment of the economic conditions.
Tax shock After a brief explanation of federal income taxes in the US, the baseline
scenario tells our respondents to imagine that income tax rates stay constant for all US
citizens over the next 12 months. In the subsequent “rise-scenario”, our respondents
receive the following instructions:
Imagine that income tax rates are unexpectedly 1 percentage point higher for
all households in the US over the next 12 months. This means that the typical
US household would pay about $400 more in taxes.
The government announces: The tax change is temporary and occurs despite
no changes in the government’s assessment of the economic conditions. More-
over, government spending does not change in response to the tax increase.
Endogenous policy response Our main object of interest is people’s beliefs about
the effects of the shocks on the unemployment and inflation rate while accounting for any
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endogenous responses to the shocks by policymakers. In Wave 1 of our experiments we did
not explicitly mention that respondents should take into account endogenous government
and central bank responses when responding to the survey. To make this point more
explicit, we gave respondents in Wave 2 of both the household and the expert survey the
following instructions:
In all your responses to the following questions, please think about what poli-
cymakers (the government and the central bank) would do under the different
scenarios. Please account for the actions of policymakers that you would
expect under the different scenarios and include them in your predictions.
Additional instructions In our instructions in both Wave 1 and Wave 2, we clearly
state that respondents should make predictions about the US economy. Nevertheless, in
Wave 2 we include an additional instruction to make sure that respondents do not instead
consider a hypothetical economy when they respond to our questions. Moreover, to make
sure that the respondents do not just interpret our questions as a test of their knowledge
of economics, we tell them that we are interested in their actual views on what would
happen under the different scenarios:
In all of the following questions, please give us your best guess about how the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the US economy would actually
develop under the scenarios considered. This may or may not be in line with
theoretical findings and evidence from economics. We are only interested in
your own views and opinions on the US economy. All of the hypothetical
scenarios and all of your predictions deal with the US economy.
Despite these differences in instructions across waves there are barely any differences in
responses across the two waves, neither in the household nor in the expert survey. We
therefore focus on the pooled sample in our main analysis.
Incentives To study the role of effort for the predictions in the vignettes, we provide
a random subset of respondents with monetary incentives in Wave 1 of the household
survey if their responses are close to the expert forecasts. Since incentivizing respondents
with expert forecasts measures households’ second-order beliefs about experts, we also
measure perceived objectivity and accuracy of experts.
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Discussion of vignette design Since we work with a general population sample, we
face a trade-off between the precision of the vignette and the ease of understanding it. To
avoid cognitive overload among the general population sample, we make the vignettes as
simple to understand as possible. At the same time, we are careful to make it clear that
the shocks are exogenous to the economy, which makes our estimates comparable to the-
oretical models and empirical evidence. For instance, we attribute the oil supply shock to
changes in the local production technology in the Middle East. Similarly, in the interest
rate scenario, we explicitly state that the change in interest rates occurs with no changes
in the Fed’s assessment of the economic conditions. Moreover, we also fix people’s beliefs
about the duration of the shocks by clarifying that the changes in taxation and govern-
ment spending only last for one year.9 For the government spending and taxation shocks,
we clarify that the temporary nature of the shock is common knowledge by using the
wording “the government announces”. Finally, many of our design choices are motivated
by common modeling assumptions in DSGE models and by empirical evidence from VARs
in order to ensure comparability of our survey responses to these external benchmarks.
For example, empirical evidence on government spending shocks often focuses on defense
spending (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012); Nakamura and Steinsson (2014)) as
this type of spending does not affect the economy’s productivity and does not directly
redistribute resources across the income distribution.
2.4 Additional variables
We elicit several additional variables in the representative survey that allow us to study
determinants and predictors of beliefs about the effects of macroeconomic shocks. In
Wave 1 of the experiment we collect beliefs about the propagation mechanisms of the
shocks and three standard questions measuring financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2014). In Wave 2 of the experiment we collect additional variables to capture respon-
dents’ evaluations of how important the inflation rate and the unemployment rate are for
their own economic situation, whether people perceive the shock variables, inflation, and
unemployment as good or bad, several questions testing the numeracy of respondents, as
well as beliefs about supply-side mechanisms operating in the context of the tax shock
9We do not fix beliefs about the duration of the change in interest rates under the monetary policy
shock, since the interest rate should react endogenously to changes in inflation and unemployment in
response to the shock through the Taylor rule.
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and the interest rate shock.
In both waves of the survey, we also collect data on gender, age, income, education,
economic education, political affiliation as well as financial assets, real assets, and out-
standing debt. Moreover, participants report whether they generally follow news on the
national economy.
3 Results
3.1 Benchmarks from the empirical and the DSGE literature
We compile a set of quantitative benchmarks for each shock from the theoretical and
empirical literature. This enables us to compare the forecasts of experts and the general
population with how the macroeconomic literature conventionally assesses the effect of
each shock on inflation and unemployment. The details of each set of calculations and
the sources used are contained in Appendix C. Table 1 reports the benchmark changes
for the unemployment and inflation rate from the theoretical and empirical literature.
The benchmarks are also depicted in Figure 2 and we discuss their magnitude compared
to the expert forecasts in the next subsection.
To ensure comparability, we first calculate the relative size of the shock in each pa-
per relative to the corresponding shock in the vignettes. For instance, most studies on
government spending consider a shock with a magnitude of 1 percent of GDP while the
spending change in our vignette is approximately 0.5 percent of GDP. We then rescale
the estimated responses of output and inflation in the papers until quarter 4 accordingly.
Since most papers focus on output as the main variable of real activity, we translate
the responses into changes in the unemployment rate using Okun’s Law. For the the-
oretical benchmarks, when possible, we consider as an immediate benchmark the most
comparable shock in a model that is widely accepted as a standard medium-size New
Keynesian DSGE model. Our main choice is Smets and Wouters (2007) and its extension
to unemployment dynamics in Gaĺı et al. (2011). As theoretical benchmarks for govern-
ment spending and tax rate shocks we also draw on the multipliers computed by Zubairy
(2014). For the oil price shock benchmarks, we take into account the changing relevance
of exogenous shocks in the world supply of oil for the US market.10
10As discussed by Baumeister and Kilian (2016), while the price spikes of the early 1970s shaped the
13
3.2 Expert predictions
We next characterize the experts’ beliefs about the effects of macroeconomic shocks pool-
ing responses from Waves 1 and 2 as we do not find any qualitative differences in predic-
tions across waves (Table A14). The expert forecasts mainly serve two purposes: (i) to
provide a benchmark for the representative sample that does not rely on any particular
model or piece of evidence; and ii) to document the average point beliefs and disagreement
within the profession and compare them to the literature benchmarks. In the analysis,
we estimate the following equations for each of the four vignettes separately:
∆ui = β1Risei + β2Falli + εi (1)
∆πi = γ1Risei + γ2Falli + ηi (2)
∆ui denotes the difference in unemployment predictions between the rise/fall scenario
and the baseline scenario (ui,rise/fall − ui,baseline). Correspondingly, ∆πi denotes the dif-
ference in inflation predictions between the rise/fall scenario and the baseline scenario
(πi,rise/fall − πi,baseline). We employ robust standard errors throughout the paper and,
wherever applicable, we cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Results are sum-
marized in Panel A of Table 2 and in Figure 2.
Oil supply shock Experts view the oil supply shock as a supply-side shock that moves
unemployment and inflation in the same direction (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2, Panel
A). In particular, they predict an increase in unemployment of 0.24 percentage points and
a rise in inflation of 0.45 percentage points in the scenario where the oil price increases
by $30. In the scenario in which the oil price decreases by $30, they predict that the
unemployment rate would be lower by 0.13 percentage points, and that the inflation rate
would be lower by 0.33 percentage points. The absolute size of these expected changes is
way economists conventionally think about oil price shocks, the many developments in the structure of
the US economy, including falling oil imports and the rise of domestic extraction, imply that the drivers
of oil prices and their transmission to the rest of the economy have shifted. For this reason, we choose
as an empirical benchmark the VAR estimate by Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010) for the post-1984 period,
which excludes the age of large oil price changes due to world supply shocks. Moreover, we base the
theoretical benchmarks for the impact of oil supply shocks on the results of Bodenstein et al. (2011)
and Balke and Brown (2018), where the former treats the US solely as an importer while the latter also
includes domestic production.
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qualitatively in line but quantitatively below the theoretical and empirical benchmarks.
Government spending shock Experts perceive the government spending shock as
a demand-side shock that leads to changes in unemployment and inflation in opposite
directions (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2, Panel A). The experts predict a 0.31 percentage
point lower unemployment rate and a 0.3 percentage point higher inflation rate in the rise-
scenario. In the fall scenario, they predict that the unemployment rate would be higher
by 0.3 percentage points and that the inflation rate would be lower by 0.22 percentage
points.
The benchmark relationship for unemployment from the literature has the same sign
as perceived by the experts, although it is smaller in size than the average expert forecast.
This difference is not large and the confidence intervals of the expert beliefs include the
upper bound of the benchmark. However, the difference may appear larger in light of the
fact that the experts were surveyed at what was likely a peak of the business cycle. As
shown by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), fiscal multipliers are empirically much
closer to zero during business cycle peaks, while they tend to be largest during recessions.
With respect to inflation, the benchmark from the DSGE literature is in line with expert
predictions qualitatively, although it is also smaller in size.
Interest rate shock Our experts predict that unemployment would be higher by 0.29
percentage points, while inflation would be lower by 0.15 percentage points in response
to an unexpected increase in the interest rate. In the fall scenario, experts predict that
unemployment would be lower by 0.19 percentage points, and that inflation would be
higher by 0.16 percentage points. This implies that the experts view monetary policy
shocks as demand-side shocks.
The predictions for the change in unemployment after a monetary contraction are
very close to the benchmark of 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points, while those for the expansion
are just below the lower bound. Inflation predictions are also very close to the 0.15-
0.20 percentage point change from the literature benchmark. Once again, considering
the point of the business cycle in which the survey was conducted provides a broader
perspective. As shown by Barnichon and Matthes (2016), when the labor market is
tight, the unemployment response to monetary policy shocks may be muted while that of
inflation is amplified. Taking this into account, the expert predictions appear even closer
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to literature benchmarks.
Tax shock On average, experts think that income taxes act as a demand-side shock
moving unemployment and inflation in opposite directions (Columns 7 and 8 in Table 2,
Panel A). A 0.22 percentage point higher unemployment rate and a 0.11 percentage point
lower inflation rate are expected under the rise-scenario. For the fall-scenario, experts
predict a 0.24 percentage point lower unemployment rate and a 0.21 percentage point
higher inflation rate.
The unemployment prediction is above the theoretical benchmark of 0.06 percentage
points but is inside the 0.2 to 0.6 range from the empirical evidence. The empirical studies
we reviewed focus on tax revenues rather than income tax rates, and may therefore not
be closely comparable. Experts believe that the responses of macro variables are stronger
for government spending shocks than for tax shocks.11 This view is consistent with
theoretical work such as that of Zubairy (2014).
Measuring disagreement Finally, we study the extent of disagreement among experts
in the different scenarios. The variances of the predicted changes in unemployment and
inflation, ∆u and ∆π, are relatively small, highlighting that there is relatively little
disagreement among the experts (see Table A6).
Result 1. Overall, experts’ predictions are broadly consistent with the empirical and
theoretical consensus for all shocks. The magnitudes of expert forecasts are broadly in the
range of quantitative estimates from DSGE models and VAR evidence.
Heterogeneity in the expert sample Using the rich demographic background data
from the World Economic Survey (Wave 2 of the expert survey), we also shed light on
correlates of making predictions that are qualitatively consistent with the theoretical and
empirical benchmarks. Overall, we find relatively little heterogeneity in expert forecasts
by gender, age, and location of the experts (Figure A.8). However, respondents who
work for policy institutions and those with a PhD are more likely to make predictions
consistent with the benchmarks (see Table A4). Moreover, the predictions of experts
based in the US are very similar to predictions from experts not based in the US (Table
11Given that the government shock is approximately equal to 0.3% of GDP and the tax shock is close
to 0.5% (see Appendix C for the calculation of these sizes), the difference would be even larger if the two
shocks were scaled to the same magnitude.
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A5). We find no significant relationship between confidence and whether the forecast is
qualitatively aligned with the literature benchmarks (Table A13).
3.3 Predictions from the representative sample
We continue with the forecasts from the general population. Panel B of Table 2 and
Figure 2 display the predictions of the inflation and the unemployment rate under the
different hypothetical scenarios. Throughout this section we report pooled results from
Wave 1 and Wave 2 as we find barely any differences in responses across the waves (Table
A14).
Oil supply shock Respondents make qualitatively and quantitatively similar predic-
tions to the experts: On average, they predict the unemployment rate to be 0.45 per-
centage points higher and the inflation rate to be 0.67 percentage points higher in the
scenario where the oil price rises by $30. In the oil price fall-scenario, they expect the
unemployment rate to be 0.21 percentage points lower and the inflation rate to be 0.33
percentage points lower.
Government spending shock Households’ beliefs about how inflation responds to
government spending changes is qualitatively consistent with expert beliefs. Households
think that inflation would be lower by 0.26 percentage points in response to an exogenous
reduction in government spending, and that it would be higher by 0.13 percentage points
in response to an increase in government spending. Households on average think that
unemployment responds to neither an increase nor a decrease in government spending.
Interest rate shock While respondents think that unemployment would be 0.17 per-
centage points higher in response to a rise in interest rates, they expect it to remain un-
changed in response to a decrease in interest rates. Respondents expect a 0.15 percentage
point lower inflation rate in response to a fall in the federal funds target rate, which is at
odds with the expert forecasts and theory. Even more striking is that households think
that an increase in the federal funds target rate would lead to a 0.19 percentage point
higher inflation rate, again contrary to the benchmarks.
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Tax shock Respondents think higher taxes would lead to a 0.3 percentage point higher
unemployment rate, and that lower taxes would result in a 0.25 percentage point lower
unemployment rate. However, they expect exogenous tax changes to influence inflation
in the opposite direction of the expert forecasts. Specifically, they predict that a tax hike
would result in a 0.21 percentage point higher inflation rate, while they forecast a 0.12
percentage point lower inflation rate in response to a tax cut.
Disagreement There is more disagreement among households than among experts.
The standard deviations of the predicted changes in unemployment and inflation, ∆u
and ∆π, are about twice as large as those among experts (see Table A6).
Result 2. For the oil supply shock and the government spending shock the general popu-
lation expects responses of both unemployment and inflation that are qualitatively aligned
with benchmarks from expert predictions and the empirical and theoretical literature. By
contrast, households predict movements in inflation in the opposite directions compared
to the benchmarks in response to the interest rate and the tax shocks, while their predic-
tions about unemployment are qualitatively aligned with the benchmarks. Finally, there
is substantial heterogeneity in predictions in the representative panel.
4 Mechanisms: heterogeneity of forecasts
In the vignettes, only 48% of all predictions from the general population are qualitatively
in line with expert and literature benchmarks (see Figure 3). In this section we study
different mechanisms that could be driving heterogeneity in the representative sample.
Understanding the determinants of forecast heterogeneity among households is critical for
informing models of expectation formation and for the policy implications of our findings.
We define making benchmark-consistent predictions as a dummy variable that takes value
one if a respondent believes that a shock affects a given variable (unemployment or infla-
tion) directionally in line with the benchmarks.12 Figure 4 depicts regression coefficients
of different potential determinants of the fraction of benchmark-consistent forecasts that
a respondent makes.
12We have at least one theoretical or empirical benchmark in all cases except for the effects of income
tax shocks on inflation. In this case we rely on the conventional view of income tax shocks as demand-side
shocks.
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Beliefs about propagation mechanisms A potential determinant of people’s beliefs
about the effects of macroeconomic shocks is their understanding of the underlying prop-
agation mechanisms. For instance, do households understand how an oil supply shock
influences demand and supply? Do they understand how demand and supply affect infla-
tion and unemployment? To better understand our respondents’ subjective models, we
measure their beliefs about the propagation mechanisms through which aggregate shocks
unfold. For instance, in a broad class of canonical models, a contractionary oil supply
shock typically (i) increases firms’ production costs and (ii) reduces households’ purchas-
ing power. This respectively shifts (iii) the supply curve and (iv) the demand curve to the
left which, in turn, affects (v) inflation and (vi) unemployment. In the interest rate shock,
it is important how the financing costs of firms (i.e. the costs of borrowing money) and
the interest rates that households earn on savings or pay on loans are usually affected.
In the income tax vignette, a pure demand-side shock, tax changes lead to a change in
purchasing power which ultimately affects inflation and unemployment through aggregate
demand.
In Wave 1 of the survey we elicit people’s beliefs about the causal direction of 14
relationships that should be relevant to the transmission of the four shocks we focus on.
For example, to measure the perceived relation between the oil price and firms’ production
costs, we ask our respondents, “How do firms’ production costs usually react if the oil
price increases?”. The answer categories are: “they increase”; “they decrease”; “neither of
the above”. We focus on questions for which there is agreement in the literature on the
sign of the relationship.13
There is substantial heterogeneity in respondents’ beliefs about propagation mecha-
nisms behind all four macroeconomic shocks (Figure A.2). We calculate a score indicating
the fraction of these 14 questions the respondent answered correctly. On average, respon-
dents answer two thirds of the questions on propagation mechanisms in line with the
benchmarks. Holding above-median correct beliefs about propagation mechanisms in-
creases the fraction of benchmark-consistent forecasts by 10 percentage points (Figure
4). These results hold in all vignettes, even after controlling for financial literacy and a
13Having a benchmark allows us to cross-randomize a subset our respondents to receiving a bonus
payment of $0.50 if a randomly selected question is answered correctly and, hence, to mitigate survey
fatigue or inattention. The incentives, however, do not affect whether respondents make forecasts that are
consistent with the benchmarks. We ask all questions to all participants (randomly ordered), irrespective
of which two vignettes they actually face.
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range of demographics (Table A7).14
Financial literacy Figure 4 shows that respondents with above median financial liter-
acy are 7 percentage points more likely to make benchmark-consistent predictions in the
vignettes. However, once we condition on people’s knowledge of propagation mechanisms,
financial literacy is not significantly related to making benchmark-consistent macroeco-
nomic forecasts except for predictions in the oil vignette, suggesting that specific knowl-
edge of propagation mechanisms seems more important than a basic understanding of
more general financial concepts (Table A7).
Supply-side view of the economy If households believe that higher income taxes
or interest rates mainly affect inflation through higher costs for firms, this could explain
why they perceive interest rate or tax hikes as inflationary. In the context of monetary
policy, this view of the shock transmission would be consistent with the widely studied
“cost channel” (Barth and Ramey, 2002). To measure respondents’ perceived relevance of
supply-side mechanisms operating in the interest rate and the taxation shock scenarios,
in Wave 2 we ask our respondents to what extent they agree with the following three
statements: (i) Firms tend to pass on increases in production costs to consumers in the
form of higher prices; (ii) Increases in income taxes tend to increase firms’ production
costs; (iii) Increases in interest rates tend to increase firms’ production costs. We catego-
rize individuals who agree to statements i) and ii)/iii) as believing in a supply-side effect
of increases in income taxes/interest rates. There is substantial heterogeneity in people’s
perceptions of the role of supply-side mechanisms, with 68 percent (77 percent) of re-
spondents believing in a cost channel going from income taxes (interest rates) to prices
(Figure A.4). People who believe in a cost channel predict a somewhat stronger (i.e. more
positive) inflation response to income tax changes, but not to interest rate hikes (Figure
4 and Table A8). The likelihood of making benchmark-consistent forecasts decreases by
12 percentage points for the income tax vignette if people have a supply-side view, but
there is no such effect in the interest rate vignette (Panel B of Table A8). Therefore,
respondents’ predictions of a positive co-movement of unemployment and inflation after
an interest rate change are not driven by a strong supply-side view of the world (i.e. the
14In unreported regressions we find no strong differences in the role of beliefs about specific propagation
mechanisms in shaping forecasts across vignettes.
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cost-channel). It thus seems that structural uncertainty about the importance of supply-
side factors cannot explain our results. However, there are potentially other dimensions
of structural uncertainty that may affect households’ beliefs, which should be tested in
future research.15
Rational inattention Do household predictions deviate from benchmarks because
holding biased beliefs about the functioning of the macroeconomy is not very costly to
households? To examine whether rational inattention is driving deviations from expert
predictions, we measure our respondents’ beliefs about the relevance of unemployment
and inflation for their own economic situation.16 Specifically, we ask respondents about
their agreement with the following two statements: (i) The US inflation rate is relevant
for my own economic situation; (ii) The US unemployment rate is relevant for my own
economic situation. Figure A.3 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the extent
to which respondents perceive the unemployment rate and the inflation rate to be relevant
for them personally. A majority of respondents (66 percent) considers the unemployment
rate to be relevant for their own situation, and the fraction is even higher for inflation (87
percent). However, these measures of perceived relevance are uncorrelated with making
predictions that are closer to benchmarks (Figure 4), suggesting that rational inattention
is not the main driver of deviations from benchmarks.
Numeracy Can a lack of numeracy explain deviations of household predictions from
benchmarks? We measure our respondents’ numeracy using seven questions that have
been applied previously in the context of macroeconomic expectations and are collected
in the Survey of Consumer Expectations (Armantier et al., 2017). We find no signifi-
cant correlation of a dummy indicating above median numeracy with the deviation of
predictions from benchmarks (Figure 4).
15For instance, the perceived persistence of the monetary policy action crucially determines house-
holds’ expectation of inflation dynamics. If households interpret an interest rate rise as permanent, they
will also revise upward their expectation of the long-run inflation rate. Furthermore, in a broad class of
New-Keynesian models, a permanent monetary tightening can increase inflation even in the short run,
an outcome known as the Neo-Fisherian effect (Cochrane, 2016). While this effect has in the past been
considered a puzzle of New-Keynesian theory, recent work provides support for its empirical existence
(Uribe, 2019).
16Macroeconomic models of rational inattention are usually concerned with inattention to the current
state of economy (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003). If rational inattention was
driving benchmark-inconsistent predictions among our respondents, this would need to be inattention to
the underlying structure of the economy.
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Good-bad heuristic Research from psychology emphasizes that individuals revert to
simple heuristics in complex decision environments in which there is much uncertainty
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). In light of this evidence, we consider whether a simple
heuristic, namely that good things only lead to good things and bad things only lead
to bad things, can explain the heterogeneity in predictions in the representative sample.
We refer to this as the good-bad heuristic (GBH). It postulates that households perceiv-
ing two variables as both good or both bad (symmetric affective evaluation) are more
likely to predict a positive co-movement between them, while predicting a movement
in opposing directions if they perceive one variable as good and the other one as bad
(asymmetric affective evaluation). Affective evaluations provide a particularly promising
basis for heuristic extrapolation because emotional responses are known to be automatic,
fast, and effortless and they typically exert a strong influence on behavior and reasoning
(Kahneman, 2003; Loewenstein, 2000; Pham, 2007).
To test this hypothesis, for each variable of interest (i.e. the four shock variables,
unemployment, and inflation), we measure whether respondents consider higher values as
good or bad for the US economy and for their own household on 7-point scales, ranging
from very bad (-3) to very good (3).17,18 Then, we derive the directional prediction that
follows from the GBH for each individual forecast. If a respondent evaluates the two
variables underlying a forecast (e.g. government spending and inflation) symmetrically
(asymetrically), the GBH implies a predicted change of the outcome variable in the
same (opposite) direction as the change in the shock variable. If at least one variable
is evaluated neutrally (neither good nor bad), no change is predicted. For example, if a
respondent perceives both higher government spending and higher inflation as bad, the
GBH predicts that she expects that inflation will increase in response to an exogenous
increase in government spending. Finally, we construct a dummy that takes value one
whenever the predicted change suggested by the GBH is in line with the benchmarks,
that is, whenever following the GBH would result in a benchmark-consistent forecast.
This dummy is used in our analyses.
We uncover a striking explanatory power of the good-bad heuristic. On average, fore-
cast consistency with benchmarks increases by 21 percentage points when the GBH makes
17Our evidence is related to small-scale survey evidence from psychology studying psychology students’
understanding of the macroeconomy (Leiser and Aroch, 2009).
18Figure A.5 highlights strong heterogeneity in affective evaluations of the different macroeconomic
variables.
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a consistent prediction (Figure 4, table 3). This amounts to a 51% increase in making
forecasts that are consistent with the benchmarks. Moreover, the good-bad heuristic
turns out to be a powerful explanatory variable in each vignette. Panel A of Table 3
shows the disaggregated results for each vignette.
The above analysis leverages two distinct sources of variation: (i) Average affective
evaluations differ across vignettes and forecasts. (ii) Within each vignette and fore-
cast, the affective evaluations differ across individuals. Both sources of variation explain
roughly half of the overall effect size, as shown by the inclusion of question fixed effects
(Panel B of Table 3). The joint estimate is robust to the inclusion of a large battery
of individual-level demographic controls. Since we have variation in forecast consistency
and the GBH on the individual level, we can even include individual fixed effects. This
even increases the estimate to 22 percentage points, which underscores the robustness of
the results on the good-bad heuristic.
How are macroeconomic variables affectively encoded by different groups? Females,
more numerate respondents, people with above-median age, and people with more debt
are substantially less likely to evaluate higher values of inflation, unemployment, oil prices,
the federal funds rate and the income taxes as good (Table A11). Holdings of real and
financial assets are largely unrelated to affective evaluations. Individuals with higher
incomes view higher values of unemployment, inflation, the oil price or the fed funds rate
as less negative, perhaps because they are less exposed to adverse macroeconomic shocks.
Democrats are more likely to evaluate higher government spending and higher taxes as
good.
Who uses the good-bad heuristic? We create a dummy variable taking value one if
a respondent’s predictions are consistent with the predictions of the good-bad heuristic.
Most demographic variables have little predictive power for which respondents use the
GBH. However, people who have an above-median age are more likely to make a prediction
consistent with the good-bad heuristic (Table A11).
Our findings on the good-bad heuristic are related to a literature on extrapolation,
which has shown that individuals extrapolate recent price changes (Bordalo et al., 2018,
2019) or extrapolate from their own situation to the macroeconomy (Kuchler and Za-
far, 2019). The patterns in our data highlight a particular form of heuristic extrapolation
across macroeconomic variables that depends on how the variables are affectively encoded,
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consistent with an important role for sentiment in expectation formation (Kamdar, 2018).
Our results thus call for a more systematic measurement of how households affectively
represent macroeconomic variables to better understand the formation of economic ex-
pectations.
Political affiliation People’s beliefs about how the economy is affected by the different
shocks could also be driven by their political ideology. However, we find no significant
heterogeneity in responses to the vignettes by people’s political affiliation, even in the
government spending vignette (see Figure 4 and Table A12).
Demographics Figure 4 highlights that there are substantial differences in the consis-
tency of predictions with benchmarks across demographic groups. People with higher net
wealth, older respondents, and college-educated respondents make a significantly higher
fraction of forecasts consistent with benchmarks, in line with roles for cognitive limitations
and learning over the life-cycle.
Confidence Confidence in predictions of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate
among respondents from the representative sample is uncorrelated with the consistency
of responses with benchmarks (Table A13 and Figure 4).
Result 3. Taken together, our evidence suggests a quantitatively important role for
the good-bad heuristic compared to all other potential determinants of household beliefs.
Knowledge about propagation mechanisms and perceived importance of supply-side mech-
anisms are also correlated with making predictions that are consistent with benchmarks,
but numeracy, perceived relevance of macroeconomic variables for the personal situation,
financial literacy, standard demographics as well as confidence are all at best weakly cor-
related with the respondents’ predictions.
5 Robustness
In this section we discuss a series of robustness checks.
Misperceived endogeneity of the interest rate shock In the interest rate vignette
we stress that the change in the Fed funds rate does not occur due to a change in the
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Fed’s assessment of economic conditions. However, there may still be a concern that
respondents in the representative sample believe that higher interest rates indicate that
the Fed is reacting to a rise in inflation, and therefore predict higher inflation. Since we
anchor people on the current level of inflation, this could only be the case if respondents
think that the Fed is reacting to a change in its outlook for future inflation. To address this
concern, in Wave 2 we elicit subjective beliefs about how the Fed usually adjusts interest
rates to (i) an unexpected increase in the outlook for inflation and (ii) an unexpected
increase in the outlook for unemployment. To do so we prompt our respondents to
“imagine that the FOMC changes their outlook for inflation (unemployment) over the next
12 months due to data revisions, while there is no change in the outlook for unemployment
(inflation). Specifically, the Fed believes that the inflation (unemployment) rate will be
0.25 percentage points higher than their initial estimate.” Thereafter, we measure people’s
beliefs about how the Fed would adjust the federal funds rate. Figure A.6 shows that
there is substantial heterogeneity in beliefs on how the Fed would adjust interest rates
in response to unexpected changes in its outlook for inflation or for unemployment. If
our results were driven by respondents attributing a higher fed funds rate to a change in
the Fed’s outlook for inflation, we would expect stronger predicted increases in inflation
in response to a positive interest rate shock for respondents who believe that the Fed
more strongly raises interest rates in response to a higher outlook for the inflation rate.
However, there is no significant heterogeneity along this dimension and, if anything,
the patterns go in the opposite direction of what would be predicted by this potential
confound (Table A17).
Incentives for vignettes To examine the role of effort and attention in responses to
the hypothetical vignettes, we provide a random subset of respondents with monetary
incentives in Wave 1 of the household survey. We inform these respondents that we asked
economic experts the same questions and that for one randomly selected question they
can earn an additional $0.50 if their response is at most 0.2 percentage points away from
the average expert response.19
Incentives moderately increase the fraction of benchmark-consistent predictions of in-
flation by 4 percentage points (Table A16 Column 1), while the predictions regarding
19$0.50 corresponds to approximately one third of the show-up fee for respondents and is thus a
relatively sizeable amount for respondents.
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unemployment are completely unaffected (Column 2). In a joint test, no effect of in-
centives on consistency of predictions with the benchmarks can be detected (Column 4),
even though incentivized respondents spend roughly 40 seconds longer in the vignettes –
a 25% increase in response time (Column 6). Since incentivizing respondents with expert
forecasts measures households’ second-order beliefs about experts, we also interact the
incentive dummy with a measure of perceived objectivity and accuracy of experts. The
effect of incentives does not significantly vary with this measure of trust in experts (Panel
B of Table A16).
Order effects To account for potential order effects, we randomize both the order of
vignettes as well as the order in which unemployment or inflation forecasts are elicited.
There are no significant order effects for the sample of experts from Wave 1 (Table A15).20
Figure A.7 shows our main results for consumers pooling across Waves 1 and 2, separately
for i) all forecasts, ii) forecasts under the first vignette faced by each respondent, iii)
forecasts for the first variable (either unemployment or inflation) in both vignettes faced
by a respondent. The figure highlights that the responses are very similar, indicating
a limited relevance of order effects, even though a highly powered formal test shows
statistical evidence of some small order effects (Table A15).
Attention to the survey Figure A.7 also displays forecasts separately iv) for a re-
stricted sample excluding respondents in the upper and lower 10% tails of the survey
time distribution, and (v) for a restricted sample excluding the 20% of respondents with
the largest absolute difference in predictions in the baseline scenarios across the two vi-
gnettes to which they responded.21 Our figure highlights very similar patterns for those
two different samples, suggesting that a lack of attention does not account for the patterns
observed in the household survey.
Wave effects We conducted both the household and expert surveys in two separate
waves, where the second wave made it more explicit i) that respondents should account for
endogenous policy responses, ii) that the survey is about the respondents’ own opinions
20The randomization of order was not feasible in the World Economic Survey (experts Wave 2).
21Given that the baseline scenarios ask respondents to assume no change in the shock variable of
interest, large differences in predictions between the two baseline scenarios each respondent faced could
indicate inattention or random response behavior.
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and not a test of their economic knowledge, and iii) that the questions are about the US
economy, as discussed in Section 2. There are no significant differences across waves in
our household survey or in our expert survey (Table A14). This suggests that the small
changes in wording and the timing of the data collection across waves do not strongly
affect the predictions.
6 Implications
In this section, we discuss the implications of our findings for macroeconomic models and
fiscal and monetary policy.
Quantitative relevance of households’ expectations What are the implications
of our findings on households’ expectations for their own optimal consumption decisions
within a theoretical framework? To provide a tentative answer, we present a simple
proof-of-concept exercise to highlight their potential quantitative importance. We embed
the empirical beliefs about the effects of a monetary policy contraction into a partial-
equilibrium version of a canonical medium-size DSGE model.
We combine the results from the monetary policy vignette with the aggregate dynam-
ics from the model of Gaĺı et al. (2011). First, we solve the model and compute the Im-
pulse Response Functions (IRFs) from a contractionary monetary policy shock. We then
construct “First-Order Conditions” (FOC) IRFs for consumption and labor supply which
are derived by combining the households’ optimization problem with the expectations for
inflation and unemployment from the vignette. Specifically, we compute counterfactual
IRFs by solving the households’ first-order conditions for consumption and labor supply
assuming that households expect inflation and unemployment to react to the shock as
indicated by the mean prediction from the survey respondents. Expectations about all
other endogenous variables are assumed to follow the path of the actual General Equilib-
rium (GE) IRFs.22 These FOC IRFs can be interpreted as the representative household’s
planned consumption and labor supply decisions in response to the monetary contraction,
formulated at the time the shock realizes, if the household holds beliefs about the macroe-
conomic effects of the shock in line with our survey findings. In other words, the exercise
examines the contemporaneous response of expectations for the household’s choice vari-
22Appendix D contains the details of this exercise.
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ables, but it does not account for any general equilibrium feedback in the succeeding
periods.
The lower panel of Figure 5 compares the GE IRFs for consumption and labor supply
with the FOC IRFs derived by imposing the empirical expectations of inflation and
unemployment from the vignettes (upper panel). Expecting positive inflation, the real
interest rate faced by households falls despite the rise in the nominal rate. Households’
optimal consumption decision, underpinned by the Euler equation, thus implies a rise in
consumption rather than the fall consistent with the GE requirement. The expected rise
in the unemployment rate is lower than in the model, leading to a smaller fall in wages
(not shown) and thus a lower reduction in households’ labor supply.
This simple illustrative exercise suggests that for the monetary shock the deviation
of households’ predictions from the equilibrium dynamics determined by the rational
expectations restrictions may have important qualitative and quantitative implications.
Modeling the expectation formation mechanism A recent research effort tries
to incorporate more realistic assumptions on the expectation formation mechanism into
macroeconomic models. What are the implications of our findings for this literature?
First, standard models assume that economic agents agree on the true model of the
economy. This also holds for models of imperfect information, in which agents may
disagree about the current state of the economy but agree on its structure (Mankiw and
Reis, 2002; Wiederholt, 2015; Woodford, 2003). These assumptions are at odds with the
substantial disagreement in household predictions about the effects of all shocks in our
survey. This finding lends support to a class of models in which households are uncertain
and may disagree about structural parameters of the economy (Bhandari et al., 2019;
Evans and Honkapohja, 2012; Milani, 2007; Orphanides and Williams, 2005).
Second, while there is substantial disagreement among our respondents across shocks,
average predictions about the inflation response to government spending shocks and
oil supply shocks and about the unemployment response to all shocks are qualitatively
aligned with benchmarks. This suggests that the assumption that households hold be-
liefs about the effects of macroeconomic shocks in line with standard models may be a
reasonable first approximation to the average household’s beliefs in these contexts.
Third, households predict movements in inflation in response to monetary policy
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shocks and tax shocks in the opposite direction compared to those predicted by standard
models. Which models could generate such beliefs? Behavioral macroeconomic models
featuring rational inattention (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003),
k-level thinking (Farhi and Werning, 2017), no higher-order beliefs (Angeletos and Lian,
2017), or myopia (Gabaix, 2018) all entail that agents’ expectations of future macroeco-
nomic fluctuations are somewhat muted in magnitude but directionally aligned with the
model’s equilibrium, which contrasts with our evidence. Our findings on the explanatory
power of the good-bad heuristic call for models in which agents’ affective judgments shape
their macroeconomic expectations (Kamdar, 2018). Extrapolation across macroeconomic
variables according to affective evaluation parallels the extrapolation of recent price trends
or personal circumstances, which has been documented by the literature (Bordalo et al.,
2018, 2019; Kuchler and Zafar, 2019). Our findings on the GBH are also consistent with
recent evidence showing that exogenously higher inflation expectations are associated
with a more pessimistic outlook about general economic conditions, and lead firms to
decrease investment expenditure (Coibion et al., 2019c) and households to reduce their
spending on durable goods (Coibion et al., 2019a). Similarly, Binder (2019) finds that
when unemployment falls, many consumers revise their inflation forecasts downward.
Fiscal and monetary policy-making Our findings also have several implications for
policymakers. For instance, on average households expect unemployment to fall in re-
sponse to a tax cut, but not after a government spending stimulus. This could lead
to differential consumption responses to the announcement of different types of fiscal
policies. Our quantitative exercise above indicates that our findings matter for the trans-
mission of monetary policy. Moreover, deviations of household beliefs from expert views
about changes in inflation in response to government and central bank policies highlight
the importance of communication. Different communication strategies could crucially
influence the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy (Blinder et al., 2008; Coibion et
al., 2019b; Haldane and McMahon, 2018; Hansen et al., 2017, 2019). Finally, our find-
ing of substantial heterogeneity in households’ beliefs about macroeconomic relationships
implies a large degree of variation in the effectiveness of monetary policy and fiscal policy
in shifting expectations and behavior for different subpopulations of interest.
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7 Conclusion
Drawing on a sample of experts and a large representative sample of the US popula-
tion, we provide evidence on beliefs about the unemployment and inflation responses to
four different macroeconomic shocks: an oil supply shock, a monetary policy shock, a
government spending shock, and a tax shock.
We establish a series of novel results: First, the expert predictions are both qualita-
tively and quantitatively aligned with the predictions from standard models and there is
relatively little disagreement among experts. Second, we find substantial heterogeneity in
responses to the vignettes in the representative panel. While for the oil supply shock and
the government spending shock experts and households expect rather similar responses
of unemployment and inflation, households’ predictions substantially deviate from those
of experts in the interest rate and the tax shock vignettes. In general, households’ predic-
tions about unemployment are largely in line with experts’ predictions, while households’
predictions about inflation in several cases deviate from our benchmarks. Third, we show
that a large fraction of deviations of household predictions from expert predictions can
be explained by the use of a simple heuristic that we label the “good-bad heuristic”. Ac-
cording to this heuristic, households who perceive two variables as both good or both
bad predict that these two variables co-move in the same direction. Our findings call
for a more systematic measurement of people’s mental representations of macroeconomic
variables to better understand the formation of their economic expectations.
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Figure 2: Beliefs about the effects of different shocks (with 95% CI)
Notes: This figure provides an overview of beliefs about the effects of macroeconomic shocks on the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate. It plots beliefs for the “rise” and “fall” scenarios for each of the
different vignettes separately. The red bars show the mean responses in the representative sample, while
the blue bars show the responses from our expert survey. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals
using robust standard errors. ∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment rate compared to
the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes the expected change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline
scenario.
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Figure 3: Distribution of benchmark-consistent forecasts among experts and the general
population
Notes: This figure shows which fraction of the predictions from experts or the general population are
directionally consistent with the theoretical and empirical benchmarks. The left panel depicts the fraction
of benchmark-consistent responses (and their 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors) for
each vignette and for inflation and unemployment separately. The third column, “both” shows how
many respondents make benchmark-consistent predictions for both the unemployment and the inflation
rate. The right panel presents the frequency distribution of total benchmark-consistent responses over
all vignettes. It ranges from 0 to 4 because respondents predict four changes in total (2 vignettes × 2
macroeconomic variables (unemployment, inflation)).
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(n = 2140, ab. med.)
Income
(n = 1798, ab. med.)
Net wealth
(n = 1882, ab. med.)
Financial wealth
(n = 2103, ab. med.)
Follow news
(n = 1063, wave 1, ab. med.)
Mechanism score
(n = 2214, ab. med.)
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(n = 1052, wave 1, ab. med.)
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(n = 1101, wave 2, ab. med.)
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(n = 1119, wave 2)
Benchm.−cons. GBH
(n = 564, wave 2, int. + tax vig.)
No supply−side view
−5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Differences in fraction of benchmark−consistent responses
Notes: This figure presents the effect of various covariates on the likelihood of making predictions that
are consistent with the benchmarks using the representative online panel. A prediction is viewed as
benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with the benchmarks. The effects are estimated in bivari-
ate regressions. The fraction of benchmark-consistent predictions is regressed on each binary covariate.
95% confidence intervals are displayed. Where applicable clustered standard errors at the respondent
level are used. Otherwise, robust standard errors are used. The underlying sample size is reported in
parentheses. If a covariate is available only in a specific wave, this is reported. “ab. med.” denotes an
indicator variable for above-median values. “Benchm.-cons. GBH” denotes an indicator taking value 1
if the respondents’ good-bad heuristic makes the benchmark-consistent prediction. For more details, see
section 4. “No supply-side view” denotes an indicator taking value 1 if a respondent does not perceive
the shock as a supply-side shock. This analysis relies on responses to the interest rate and income tax
rate scenarios only. See Section 4 for more details.
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock (in-
terest rate rise): rational expectations model and “first-order conditions” responses using
empirical expectations.
Notes: The blue cirlces report the general-equilibrium rational-expectations IRFs from a monetary policy
shock from Gaĺı et al. (2011), rescaled to be consistent with the size of the shock in the vignette. In the
upper panels, the red diamonds plot the IRFs of the model for unemployment and inflation “chained”
to be consistent with the households’ mean expectations from the vignette (black crosses). In the lower
panels, the red diamonds report the “First-Order Conditions” IRFs for consumption and labor supply
computed using the household’s first-order conditions and the model’s IRFs for the necessary endogenous
variables, and the adjusted IRFs for inflation and unemployment from the upper panel. The FOC IRFs
can be interpreted as the household’s optimal plan for future consumption and labor supply, formulated
once the shock occurs, if expectations for inflation and unemployment were aligned with those from the
vignette. See Section 6 and Appendix D for more details.
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Main Tables
Table 1: Benchmarks for the sign and size of the effects of different shocks
Shock Unemployment Response Inflation Response
Sign Value (p.p.) Sign Value (p.p.)
Oil price rise
(55% higher price)
Theory + 0.42 to 0.88
Empirical + 0.42 + 1.4
Government spending rise
(2.4% higher growth rate)
Theory − −0.1 to −0.2 + 0.15 to 0.2
Empirical − −0.16 to −0.3
Interest rate rise
(0.5 b.p. higher rate)
Theory + 0.4 to 0.5 − −0.15
Empirical + 0.2 − −0.2
Tax rate rise
(1 p.p. higher rates)
Theory + 0.06
Empirical + 0.2 to 0.6
Notes: The table reports the benchmarks for changes in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate
four quarters after the respective shock from the theoretical and empirical literature. The values are
adjusted to be comparable to the size of the shocks in our survey. Empty fields indicate that – to the
best of our knowledge – there is no robust and rigorous evidence on the effect of a given shock on the
respective outcome variable of interest. Appendix C contains details on the papers surveyed for this
exercise and the calculations used to the derive the values.
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Table 2: Beliefs about the effects of different shocks
Panel A: Experts
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.327∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.037) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.028)
rise 0.449∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036)
p-values from additional tests
(i) fall6=rise <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(ii) |fall|6=|rise| 0.858 0.596 0.088 0.566 0.106 0.055 0.657 0.331
Observations 482 481 474 475 517 513 515 521
R2 0.333 0.120 0.373 0.352 0.096 0.270 0.093 0.164
Panel B: General Population
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.331∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.150∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.122∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.043) (0.051)
rise 0.667∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ −0.023 0.193∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.047) (0.041) (0.046) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
p-values from additional tests
(i) fall6=rise <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.31 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(ii) |fall|6=|rise| 0.007 0.643 0.089 0.694 0.054 0.418 0.257 0.634
(iii) 6= exp.: fall 0.954 0.192 0.467 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 0.794
(iv) 6= exp.: rise <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.02 <0.001 0.18
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,085 1,085 1,123 1,123 1,121 1,121
R2 0.159 0.085 0.042 0.001 0.029 0.014 0.027 0.056
Notes: This table provides an overview of beliefs about the effect of the different shocks on the unem-
ployment rate and the inflation rate. It displays beliefs for the “rise” and “fall” scenarios for each of
the different vignettes separately. Panel A provides evidence from the expert sample. Panel B displays
responses from the representative online panel. ∆u denotes the predicted change in the unemployment
rate compared to the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes the predicted change in the inflation rate compared
to the baseline scenario. Additionally, p-values from the following regressions are reported: (i) test
whether there is a difference between rise and fall predictions, (ii) test whether there is a difference in
the absolute size of rise and fall predictions, (iii) test whether there is a difference in fall predictions
between experts and the general population, (iv) repeats this test for rise predictions. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table 3: Evidence for the Good-Bad Heuristic
Panel A: Effect on forecast consistency with benchmarks for each vignette
pooled over all questions with question FE
oilX gov.X fed.X taxX oilX gov.X fed.X taxX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
benchm. c. GBH 0.130∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.048 0.084∗∗
(0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.571∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Question FE? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,110 1,118 1,114 1,134 1,110 1,118 1,114 1,134
R2 0.014 0.021 0.024 0.045 0.020 0.024 0.048 0.074
Panel B: Effect on forecast consistency with benchmarks pooled over all vignettes
pooled over all questions with question FE
allX allX allX allX allX allX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
benchm. c. GBH 0.208∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026)
Constant 0.408∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.145) (0.016) (0.025) (0.144) (0.036)
Question FE? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls? No Yes - No Yes -
Ind. FE? No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 4,476 3,580 4,476 4,476 3,580 4,476
R2 0.043 0.044 0.279 0.078 0.073 0.309
Panel C: Effect on forecasts pooled over all vignettes
pooled over all questions with question FE
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fall −0.215∗∗∗ −0.040 −0.289∗∗∗ −0.066
(0.059) (0.075) (0.068) (0.083)
rise 0.158∗∗∗ 0.048 0.088 0.018
(0.061) (0.070) (0.068) (0.080)
fall×GBH pos. −0.050 −0.142∗ −0.060 −0.155∗
(0.072) (0.086) (0.072) (0.086)
rise×GBH pos. 0.176∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.079) (0.071) (0.080)
Question FE? No No Yes Yes
Obs. 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238
R2 0.054 0.034 0.056 0.037
Notes: This table reports two tests of the Good-Bad Heuristic (GBH), conducted with Wave 2 from the general population
sample. A prediction is viewed as benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with the benchmarks. In panels A and
B, an indicator for a benchmark-consistent forecast is regressed on the dummy benchm. c. GBH that takes value one if
a participant’s GBH makes the benchmark-consistent forecast. Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a
benchmark-consistent GBH on the probability of a benchmark-consistent forecast. Panel A conducts the analysis vignette
by vignette. For instance, the first column oilXruns the analysis for the forecasts in the oil vignette. Panel B pools over
all vignettes. Panel C summarizes the effect of the GBH on raw forecasts. ∆u and ∆π denote the expected changes in
the unemployment rate and the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. GBH pos. is a dummy that takes value
1 if the GBH predicts a positive change in the outcome variable. Question FE indicate fixed effects for each vignette-
rate forecast. Controls (Panel B) include age, education, log income, net wealth (inverse hyperbolic sine transformation),
log financial wealth, gender, numeracy, news consumption, the perceived relevance of macroeconomic conditions for the
personal situation, and political affiliation. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Online Appendix: Subjective Models of the
Macroeconomy: Evidence from Experts and a
Representative Sample
Peter Andre1 Carlo Pizzinelli2
Christopher Roth3 Johannes Wohlfart4
Summary of the online Appendix
Section A provides additional figures. Figure A.1 provides an overview of the raw data
in the different scenarios. Figure A.2 shows descriptive evidence regarding people’s be-
liefs about propagation mechanisms. Figure A.3 shows descriptive evidence regarding
respondents’ perceptions of the relevance of inflation and unemployment for their own
household. Figure A.4 displays descriptives regarding people’s perceptions of the supply-
side channels through which the interest rate shock and the income taxation shock could
operate. Figure A.5 provides descriptives on the “good-bad heuristic”. Figure A.6 pro-
vides descriptive evidence regarding subjective interest rate rules. Figure A.7 graphically
displays the household predictions for different subsamples of respondents. Figure A.8
displays experts’ forecasts for different subgroups.
Section B provides additional tables. Table A1 shows an overview of the four surveys
that we conducted. Tables A2 and A3 provide summary statistics for the covariates of the
representative online panel and the expert sample respectively. Tables A4 and A5 shed
light on heterogeneity in expert predictions. Table A6 displays the variance in responses
across the vignettes separately for consumers and experts. Table A7 analyzes whether
benchmark-consistent forecasts are associated with higher understanding of the shocks’
propagation mechanisms. Table A8 shows heterogeneous results by people’s perception
of the supply-side effects of the macroeconomic shocks. Table A9 tests for the relevance
of rational inattention. Table A10 correlates demographics with a dummy for making
1Peter Andre, University of Bonn, p.andre@uni-bonn.de
2Carlo Pizzinelli, IMF, cpizzinelli@imf.org
3Christopher Roth, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, briq, CESifo, CAGE,
email: Christopher.Roth@warwick.ac.uk
4Johannes Wohlfart, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, e-mail: jo-
hannes.wohlfart@gmx.de
1
predictions that are consistent with the good-bad heuristic. Table A11 displays correlates
of the affective evaluations of different macroeconomic variables. Table A12 examines
whether people’s political affiliation significantly affects responses to the vignettes. Table
A13 correlates measured confidence with the consistency of predictions with benchmarks.
Table A14 tests for the relevance of wave effects. Table A15 displays tests for order effects.
Table A16 displays the effect of incentives. Table A17 displays heterogeneous responses
to the vignettes by people’s perception of how interest rates would respond to changes in
expected inflation and unemployment.
Section C provides details on the empirical and theoretical literature used to derive
the benchmarks for changes in unemployment and inflation in response to shocks. Section
E provides additional details on recruitment in Wave 1 of the expert survey.
2
A Additional figures
Figure A.1: Overview of raw data: Predictions
Notes: This figure plots mean predicted levels of unemployment and inflation by experts and respondents
from the representative samples across the different vignettes and scenarios.
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Notes: This figure uses data from the representative online panel and shows the frequency of people’s responses
to the propagation mechanism questions related to all four vignettes. “+” indicates that people perceive a
positive association between two variables; “−” indicates that people perceive a negative association between
two variables. “o” indicates that people perceive neither a positive nor a negative association. The green bars
show the fractions of correct responses, while the red bars show the fractions of incorrect responses for each of
the questions separately.
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Figure A.3: Descriptive statistics: Rational inattention
Inflation rate Unemployment rate










Notes: The figure presents the distribution of responses to the two rational inattention questions. The
questions measure agreement with the statements: (i) The US inflation rate is relevant for my own
economic situation. (ii) The US unemployment rate is relevant for my own economic situation. The
answers are coded as follows: +++: strongly agree, ++: agree, +: somewhat agree, - somewhat disagree,
- -: disagree, - - -: strongly disagree.
Figure A.4: Descriptive statistics: Supply-side view of the economy
Prod. costs passed on Taxes increase prod. costs Interest rates increase prod. costs






















(B) Fraction of 
 respondents who 
 anticipate a
 supply−side effect
Notes: Panel A presents the distribution of responses to the three supply-side questions. The questions
measure agreement with the statements: (i) Firms tend to pass on increases in production costs to
consumers in the form of higher prices. (ii) Increases in income taxes tend to increase firms’ production
costs. (iii) Increases in interest rates tend to increase firms’ production costs. The answers are coded as
follows: + + +: strongly agree, + +: agree, +: somewhat agree, - somewhat disagree, - -: disagree, - -
-: strongly disagree. Panel B displays the fraction of respondents that believe in a supply-side effect, i.e.
agree with statements (i) and (ii) for the income taxes case and statements (i) and (iii) for the interest
rate case.
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(B) Distribution of evaluations






















(C) Distribution of the GBH prediction for each vignette and rate
Notes: Panel A presents the average affective evaluation of the different variables (with 95% CI) and panel
B its distribution. Panel C displays how many respondents’ GBH predicts an increase (+), a decrease
(–), or no change (o) of unemployment or inflation across vignettes. For a discussion, see Section 4.
6
Figure A.6: Descriptive statistics for the subjective interest rate rules
π outlook is 0.25 pp. higher u outlook is 0.25 pp. higher
















Mean plot: Distribution of fed funds rate reaction (averaged across individuals)
π outlook is 0.25 pp. higher u outlook is 0.25 pp. higher










Histogram: Individual expected fed funds rate reaction (integrated for each individual)
Notes: This figure analyzes the distribution of responses to the subjective interest rate rule questions in
Wave 2 of the general population sample. Respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood of different
federal funds target rate changes in response to a 0.25 pp. increase in the Fed’s outlook for the inflation
rate or the unemployment rate. For each possible federal funds target rate reaction, the “Mean plot”
summarizes the average probability assigned to this event (averaged across individuals). The histogram
plots the distribution of individual-level expected changes in the federal funds target rate in response to
increases in the Fed’s outlook for inflation or unemployment (integrated for each individual).
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Figure A.7: Procedural robustness of results (with 95% CI)
∆ π ∆ u
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 Full sample    First vignette    First question    Survey duration    Similar baseline predictions
Notes: This figure provides an overview of procedural robustness checks that repeat the main analysis
for different subsamples. It plots predicted changes in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate
for the “rise” and “fall” scenarios for each of the different vignettes separately. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals using robust standard errors. ∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment
rate compared to the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes the expected change in the inflation rate compared
to the baseline scenario. “Full sample” denotes the full sample and, thus, replicates the results of figure
2. “First vignette” contains only the responses to the first vignette, while “First question” focuses only
on responses to the first forecast question (in both vignettes). “Survey duration” excludes both 10% tails
in the survey duration distribution, and “Similar baseline prediction” excludes the 20% respondents with
the largest absolute difference in baseline predictions across the two vignettes they responded to.
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Figure A.8: Heterogeneity in experts’ forecasts (with 95% CI)
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 Wave 2 sample with demo.  
 Age (above−median)  
 Male  
 Academic research (ab.−median)  
 Policy (ab.−median)  
 Ph.D.  
 Advanced economies  
Notes: This figure provides an overview of forecast heterogeneity for the expert wave 2 sample for which
data on background characteristics are available (n = 596). It repeats the main analysis for different
subsamples and plots expected changes in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate for the “rise” and
“fall” scenarios for each of the different vignettes separately. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment rate compared to the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes
the expected change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. “Wave 2 sample with demo.”
denotes the full sample that satisfies the conditions mentioned above. “Age (above-median)” contains
only respondents with above-median age. “Male” contains only male respondents. “Academic research
(ab.-median)” focuses on respondents that spend an above-median percentage of their working time on
academic research, while “Policy (ab.-median)” restricts the sample to those who do an above-median
amount of policy work. “Ph.D.” contains only respondents with a Ph.D., and “Advanced economies”
contains only respondents that are registered at the WES to make forecasts about an advanced economy
(as classified by the IMF).
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B Additional tables
Table A1: Overview of experiments






(in terms of age, income,
region, gender, and educa-
tion) in collaboration with
Research Now
Hypothetical vignettes
on oil supply shock, gov-
ernment spending shock,









(in terms of age, income,
region, gender, and educa-
tion) in collaboration with
Lucid
Hypothetical vignettes
on oil supply shock, gov-
ernment spending shock,












Experts recruited via email
invitation (for details see
Section E)
Hypothetical vignettes
on oil supply shock, gov-
ernment spending shock,
interest rate shock and
tax shock
None
Experts Wave 2 (July
2019) (N=908)
Experts recruited via the ifo
World Economic Survey
Hypothetical vignettes
on oil supply shock, gov-
ernment spending shock,
interest rate shock and
tax shock
None
Notes: This table provides an overview of the different conducted experiments.
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At least bachelor’s degree 30% 32%





Notes: This table compares the distributions of individual characteristics in our sample with those in
the American Community Survey (ACS) 2017.
Table A3: Summary statistics: Covariates in the expert sample




Policy institution 16% 16%
Academia 83% 56%
Bank or company 0% 16%
Full professor 21%
PhD student 18%
Field of study: economics 84%
Field of study: business 7%
Ph.D. 65%
Region: Western Europe 42%
Region: Eastern Europe 12%
Region: CIS 7%
Region: North America 8%
Region: Latin America 10%
Region: Africa 7%
Region: Near East 2%
Region: Asia 10%
Region: Oceania 2%
Notes: This table provides an overview of the covariates in the expert sample. Different covariates were
collected in the two waves. Moreover, demographic data are not available for all respondents.
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Table A4: Heterogeneity among experts
∆πX ∆uX allX
(1) (2) (3)
age (ab.-median) −0.031 0.028 −0.002
(0.029) (0.030) (0.024)
female −0.043 0.001 −0.021
(0.049) (0.044) (0.035)
policy (ab.-median) 0.066∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024)
research (ab.-median) 0.006 0.028 0.017
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028)
Ph.D. 0.089∗∗ 0.013 0.051∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029)






Observations 525 525 525
R2 0.036 0.018 0.031
Notes: This table displays predictors of benchmark-consistent forecasts among experts from the wave 2
expert sample that responded to all forecast questions and for whom data on background characteristics
is available (n=525). A forecast change is viewed as benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with
the median response and the macroeconomic benchmark estimates. For each expert, ∆πXmeasures the
fraction of benchmark-consistent inflation forecasts (out of 2), ∆uXthe fraction of benchmark-consistent
unemployment forecasts (out of 2), and allXthe overall fraction of benchmark-consistent forecasts (out
of 4). Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effects on the probability of a benchmark-consistent
forecast. The predictors include above-median dummies in age, time spent on policy work, time spent on
research work, and average expressed confidence as well as indicators for female respondents, respondents
with a Ph.D. and respondents from advanced economies (IMF classification). Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A5: Do US experts make more forecasts that are more consistent with models?
∆πX ∆uX allX
(1) (2) (3)
US −0.071 −0.043 −0.057
(0.044) (0.041) (0.035)
Constant 0.758∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Observations 862 862 862
R2 0.003 0.001 0.003
Notes: This Table uses data from all experts from Wave 1 and Wave 2 that responded to all forecast
questions and for whom we know whether they are based in the US or not. This table analyzes whether
experts from the US make more benchmark-consistent forecasts in the hypothetical vignettes about the
US economy. A predicted change is viewed as benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with
the median response and the macroeconomic benchmark estimates. For each expert, ∆πXmeasures the
fraction of benchmark-consistent inflation forecasts (out of 2), ∆uXthe fraction of benchmark-consistent
unemployment forecasts (out of 2), and allXthe overall fraction of benchmark-consistent forecasts (out
of 4). Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on the probability of a benchmark-consistent
forecast. An expert is classified as “US” if he or she works at a US institution (Wave 1, n = 33) or is
registered to make regular forecasts about the US economy in the ifo World economic survey (Wave 2,
n = 52). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and
*** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A6: Disagreement in predicted changes in unemployment and inflation
∆π ∆u
σexperts σgen. pop. p σexperts σgen. pop. p
oil price – rise 0.28 0.74 <0.01 0.27 0.64 <0.01
oil price – fall 0.32 0.71 <0.01 0.28 0.69 <0.01
gov. spend. – rise 0.22 0.54 <0.01 0.27 0.61 <0.01
gov. spend. – fall 0.20 0.61 <0.01 0.24 0.63 <0.01
fed. funds rate – rise 0.31 0.52 <0.01 0.27 0.55 <0.01
fed. funds rate – fall 0.28 0.59 <0.01 0.25 0.63 <0.01
inc. taxes – rise 0.29 0.52 <0.01 0.26 0.55 <0.01
inc. taxes – fall 0.25 0.58 <0.01 0.27 0.56 <0.01
weighted mean 0.27 0.60 0.26 0.61
Notes: This table reports the standard deviations of expert forecasts and of forecasts from the general
population as well as p-values from a Levene’s test of equality of variance (trimmed, median-based,
bootstrapped) for each rise or fall scenario. The data is trimmed by 0.05 percentage points on both tails
to reduce the influence of outliers. The last row presents the average within-scenario standard deviation,
weighted by the differential number of respondents across scenarios.
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Table A7: Understanding of propagation mechanisms and benchmark-consistent forecasts
Panel A: For each vignette
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆πX ∆uX bothX ∆πX ∆uX bothX ∆πX ∆uX bothX ∆πX ∆uX bothX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MS 0.120∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.039∗∗ −0.008 0.070∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.031 0.052∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017)
fin. lit. 0.050∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ −0.012 0.013 0.013 0.001 −0.027 −0.018 0.003 −0.011 −0.006
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018)
Constant 0.712∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016)
Obs. 521 521 521 508 508 508 543 543 543 532 532 532
R2 0.120 0.066 0.097 0.012 0.019 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.008
Panel B: Pooled over all vignettes
∆πX ∆uX bothX allX ∆πX ∆uX bothX allX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MS 0.047∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
fin. lit. 0.010 0.008 0.017 0.009 0.009 −0.000 0.013 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 0.468∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.421∗∗ 0.111 0.411∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.180) (0.196) (0.160) (0.135)
Add. ctrl? – – – – X X X X
Obs. 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 870 870 870 870
R2 0.022 0.036 0.037 0.055 0.022 0.043 0.042 0.052
Notes: This table analyzes the relationship between responding correctly to the propagation mecha-
nism questions and making benchmark-consistent vignette forecasts. A vignette forecast is viewed as
benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with the median expert response. MS is the standard-
ized number of correctly answered mechanism questions. fin. lit. is the standardized number of correct
answers in the standard three-item financial literacy test. The coefficients can be read as the percentage
point increase in benchmark-consistent forecasts associated with a 1 standard deviation increase in MS
(or fin. lit.).
Panel A conducts the analyze for each vignette separately. The outcome variables (∆πX, ∆uX, bothX)
are binary and indicate whether a vignette forecast (for the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, or
both rates jointly) is benchmark-consistent. Panel B performs an analysis pooled over all vignettes.
Here, ∆πXmeasures the fraction of benchmark-consistent inflation forecasts (out of 2), ∆uXthe fraction
of benchmark-consistent unemployment forecasts (out of 2), bothXthe fraction of vignettes in which
both forecasts are benchmark-consistent (out of 2), and allXthe overall fraction of benchmark-consistent
forecasts (out of 4). Controls (Panel B) include age, education, log income, net wealth (inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation), log financial wealth, gender and news consumption. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A8: Effect of having a supply-side view on vignette forecasts
Panel A: The effect of having a supply-side view on forecasts
fed. funds rate income taxes both vignettes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fall −0.195 0.102 −0.027 −0.154 −0.088 −0.061
(0.142) (0.151) (0.104) (0.123) (0.086) (0.098)
rise 0.197∗ 0.152 0.162 0.297∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.104) (0.135) (0.168) (0.143) (0.099) (0.106)
fall×int supply 0.001 −0.148
(0.163) (0.169)
rise×int supply −0.010 0.034
(0.126) (0.151)
fall×tax supply −0.217 −0.271∗
(0.135) (0.159)






Obs. 557 557 571 571 1,128 1,128
R2 0.031 0.016 0.031 0.072 0.030 0.036
Panel B: The effect of having a supply-side view on the consistency of forecasts with the benchmarks
fed. funds rate income taxes both vignettes
∆πX ∆uX allX ∆πX ∆uX allX ∆πX ∆uX allX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
int supply −0.008 0.003 −0.003
(0.048) (0.051) (0.031)
tax sup. −0.116∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.058∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.029)
supply −0.070∗∗ −0.006 −0.038∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.021)
Constant 0.317∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.027) (0.036) (0.037) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.018)
Obs. 557 557 557 571 571 571 1,128 1,128 1,128
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.003
Notes: This table reports regressions that test whether having a supply-side view of the economy affects
vignette forecasts. int/tax supply are dummies taking value one if the respondent thinks that the shock
(fed. funds rate / income taxes) increases production costs and that firms pass this on to consumers.
Columns 5 and 6 in panel A as well as 7 to 9 in panel B report estimates with data pooled over both
vignettes and standard errors that are clustered on the respondent level. Here, supply indicates a supply-
side view for the vignette at hand.
Panel A analyzes the effect of having a supply-side view on the predicted changes of the inflation and
unemployment rate. Panel B analyzes the effect on making benchmark-consistent forecasts. A vi-
gnette forecast is viewed as benchmark-consistent if it is in line with the median expert response or
the VAR/DSGE benchmark. The outcome variables ∆πXand ∆uXare binary and indicate whether a
vignette forecast (for the inflation rate, the unemployment rate) is benchmark-consistent. allX takes
value zero if no forecast in a vignette is benchmark-consistent, 0.5 if exactly one forecast is benchmark-
consistent, and 1 if both forecasts are benchmark-consistent. Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted
as the effect of having a supply-side view on the probability of making a benchmark-consistent forecast.
Robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10
pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A9: Effect of rational (in)attention on benchmark-consistent forecasts
Only inflation forecast Only unemployment forecast Pooled
∆πX ∆πX ∆πX ∆uX ∆uX ∆uX allX allX allX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
π relevant 0.035∗ 0.010 0.022
(0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
u relevant 0.030 −0.022 0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
index 0.055∗∗∗ −0.019 0.018
(0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
Constant 0.452∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Obs. 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Notes: This table reports regressions of making benchmark-consistent forecasts on three measures of
respondents’ perceived relevance of macroeconomic variables for their own situation. A vignette forecast
is viewed as benchmark-consistent if it is directionally in line with the median expert response. For each
individual, ∆πXmeasures the fraction of benchmark-consistent inflation forecasts (out of 2), ∆uXthe
fraction of benchmark-consistent unemployment forecasts (out of 2), and allXthe overall fraction of
benchmark-consistent forecasts (out of 4). π relevant is a dummy that takes value 1 if a respondent
agrees or strongly agrees with the statement “The US inflation rate is relevant for my own economic
situation.”. u relevant is an analogous variable for the unemployment rate. index is a combined binary
measure that takes value one for respondents with above-median agreement to the two statements.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1
pct. level.
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Notes: This table analyzes who uses the Good-Bad Heuristic (GBH). The outcome variable is the fraction
of an individual’s forecasts that are in line with his/her GBH (out of four forecasts in total). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A11: Heterogeneity in affective evaluations
inflation unemployment oil price gov. spending fed. funds
rate
income taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
female −0.053∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.096∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.060∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
age −0.091∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.024)
college+ −0.006 −0.001 0.023 0.047 0.049∗ 0.032
(0.024) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031)
econ. coll.+ 0.020 0.024 0.030 0.050 0.049 0.025
(0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
numeracy −0.096∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.046 −0.044∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027)
log income 0.050∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.021 0.067∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
log real est. wealth −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log debt −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log fin. wealth −0.005∗ −0.005∗ −0.004 −0.002 0.002 −0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
rat. inatt. 0.004 −0.017 −0.028 0.014 0.009 −0.060∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
democrat 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.104∗∗∗ 0.018 0.064∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
avg. conf. 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Constant −0.284∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗ −0.014 −0.487∗∗ 0.122
(0.167) (0.139) (0.174) (0.222) (0.199) (0.214)
Observations 895 895 895 895 895 895
R2 0.127 0.136 0.140 0.066 0.084 0.097
Notes: This table studies heterogeneity in affective evaluations of the six variables (inflation, unemploy-
ment, oil price, government spending, federal funds rate and income tax rates). The dependent variables
are indicators that take value 1 if a variable is evaluated positively (that is, the average rating on the two
scales from -3 (very bad) to 3 (very good) for the two subitems (personal and economy-wide evaluation)
is strictly positive). Explanatory variables include indicators for being female, above-median age, college
education (or higher), economics education on college level (or higher), an above-median numeracy score,
an above-median rational inattention score, being a Democrat (versus Republican or independent), and
an above-median average forecast confidence. Moreover, log income, log real estate wealth, log debt,
and log financial wealth are included, where 1 is added to include zeros. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A12: Political heterogeneity in forecasts
Panel A: Political heterogeneity in forecasts
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.362∗∗∗ −0.117 −0.253∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ −0.139∗ −0.054 −0.160∗∗ −0.190∗∗
(0.072) (0.083) (0.069) (0.066) (0.082) (0.075) (0.067) (0.079)
rise 0.614∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ −0.026 0.083 0.166∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.084) (0.070) (0.073) (0.066) (0.073) (0.057) (0.070)
fall×democrat 0.119 −0.108 0.006 −0.130 0.001 0.087 0.025 −0.150
(0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.104) (0.115) (0.106) (0.101) (0.124)
rise×democrat 0.118 −0.001 −0.114 0.006 0.208∗∗ 0.089 −0.062 −0.201∗∗
(0.125) (0.110) (0.095) (0.103) (0.089) (0.097) (0.089) (0.095)
Joint F-test does not detect a significant effect of democrat.
p = 0.211
Observations 839 839 827 827 834 834 856 856
R2 0.161 0.086 0.033 0.005 0.030 0.023 0.032 0.060
Panel B: Political heterogeneity in consistency of forecasts with the benchmarks
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
democrat −0.033 0.012 0.001 0.013 −0.046 −0.004 0.015 −0.006
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Constant 0.728∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Joint F-test does not detect a significant effect of democrat.
p = 0.823
Observations 839 839 827 827 834 834 856 856
R2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: This table provides an overview of political heterogeneity in forecasts in the representative sample.
Respondents for whom data on political affiliation is missing or who respond that they are Independent
are excluded. Panel A displays predicted changes in unemployment and inflation for each of the different
vignettes separately. ∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment rate compared to the baseline
scenario. ∆π denotes the expected change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. Panel
B displays differences in making benchmark-consistent forecasts. The outcome variables (∆πX, ∆uX,
bothX) are binary and indicate whether a vignette forecast (for the inflation rate, the unemployment rate,
or both rates jointly) is benchmark-consistent. A vignette forecast is viewed as benchmark-consistent if
it is directionally in line with the median expert response. Both panels report a joint F-test that results
from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with respondent-level clustered standard errors and tests
for an overall zero effect of democrat. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance
at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A13: Confidence and making benchmark-consistent forecasts
Panel A: Experts
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
confidence 0.026 0.042 −0.023 0.035 −0.017 0.027 −0.011 0.050∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027)
Constant 0.846∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 481 478 474 472 516 509 514 513
R2 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.007
Panel B: General population
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX ∆πX ∆uX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
confidence 0.002 −0.027 −0.024 −0.011 0.019 0.037∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.024
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Constant 0.705∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,085 1,085 1,123 1,123 1,121 1,121
R2 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.002
Panel C: Determinants of confidence in general population








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female −0.381∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
age −0.002∗ −0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
std. ln(inc.) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.048 0.077∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.019) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
college 0.004 −0.024 0.033 −0.023 0.024
(0.038) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058)
Constant 0.351∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.094) (0.096) (0.093) (0.100)
Observations 2,140 1,064 1,055 1,075 1,086
R2 0.057 0.046 0.068 0.070 0.039
Notes: This table assesses the role of confidence in the predictions across vignettes. A forecast is clas-
sified as benchmark-consistent if it follows the same qualitative direction as the median expert forecast.
Confidence is measured on a 5-point scale reaching from -2 to 2. Panel A shows how confidence affects
making benchmark-consistent predictions among experts. Panel B shows how confidence affects making
benchmark-consistent forecasts in the representative sample. Panel C displays the determinants of con-
fidence (averaged over confidence in inflation and unemployment forecasts) in the representative sample
separately for each shock. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct.,
** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A14: Robustness: Wave effects
Panel A: Experts
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.502∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ −0.156∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.077) (0.032) (0.055) (0.068) (0.074) (0.072) (0.045)
rise 0.496∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.067) (0.062) (0.054) (0.044) (0.054) (0.046)
fall×wave 2 0.216∗∗ 0.047 0.075∗ −0.043 −0.012 −0.038 0.013 −0.008
(0.103) (0.087) (0.043) (0.062) (0.074) (0.078) (0.080) (0.055)
rise×wave 2 −0.059 −0.075 −0.082 0.029 0.124∗ −0.092∗ 0.091 −0.047
(0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.066) (0.053) (0.067) (0.063)
Joint F-test does not detect a significant effect of wave.
p = 0.305
Observations 482 481 474 475 517 513 515 521
R2 0.341 0.122 0.378 0.353 0.100 0.274 0.095 0.164
Panel B: General Population
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.319∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ 0.075 −0.121∗ −0.038 −0.058 −0.170∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.058) (0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.050) (0.057)
rise 0.773∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.100 −0.048 0.184∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.044) (0.061) (0.052) (0.059)
fall×wave 2 −0.022 0.062 −0.072 −0.062 −0.057 0.019 −0.118 −0.147
(0.100) (0.098) (0.089) (0.089) (0.096) (0.091) (0.083) (0.098)
rise×wave 2 −0.212∗∗ 0.051 0.065 0.047 0.017 0.025 0.029 0.069
(0.106) (0.095) (0.083) (0.091) (0.073) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089)
Joint F-test does not detect a significant effect of wave.
p = 0.620
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,085 1,085 1,123 1,123 1,121 1,121
R2 0.162 0.086 0.043 0.002 0.029 0.014 0.029 0.058
Notes: This table provides an overview of differences in forecasts across survey waves. Panel A uses
data from the expert sample. Panel B uses data from the general population sample. ∆u denotes the
expected change in the unemployment rate compared to the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes the expected
change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. wave 2 is an indicator taking value one
if a respondent participates in the second wave of the data collection. Both panels report a joint F-test
that results from SUR regressions with respondent-level clustered standard errors and tests for an overall
zero effect of wave 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at
5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A15: Robustness: Vignette and question order effects
Panel A: Order effects on forecasts of experts
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.670∗∗∗ −0.109 −0.323∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.150 −0.264∗∗ 0.227∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.088) (0.053) (0.084) (0.113) (0.123) (0.112) (0.087)
rise 0.588∗∗∗ 0.115 0.364∗∗∗ −0.160∗ −0.335∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.105) (0.093) (0.085) (0.118) (0.096) (0.065) (0.062)
fall× u. first 0.133 −0.070 −0.038 −0.024 −0.043 0.139 −0.137 0.067
(0.195) (0.159) (0.063) (0.117) (0.129) (0.133) (0.167) (0.096)
rise× u. first −0.148 0.093 −0.059 −0.176 0.079 0.061 0.290∗∗ −0.096
(0.116) (0.107) (0.140) (0.139) (0.121) (0.099) (0.123) (0.114)
fall× 2nd vig. 0.196 −0.045 0.113∗ −0.067 0.079 0.071 0.104 0.013
(0.198) (0.164) (0.064) (0.116) (0.130) (0.134) (0.162) (0.092)
rise× 2nd vig. −0.029 0.277∗∗∗ 0.063 −0.224∗ 0.106 0.010 −0.174 0.143
(0.118) (0.107) (0.147) (0.134) (0.116) (0.097) (0.109) (0.106)
Joint F-tests.
u. first p = 0.521
2nd vig. p = 0.122
Observations 95 95 85 85 85 85 90 90
R2 0.513 0.272 0.519 0.473 0.236 0.342 0.222 0.412
Panel B: Order effects on forecasts of general population
oil price gov. spending fed. funds rate income taxes
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fall −0.487∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.325∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.136∗ −0.293∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.081) (0.075) (0.080) (0.079) (0.069) (0.081) (0.100)
rise 0.761∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.103 −0.131∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.059 0.293∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.091) (0.088) (0.080) (0.065) (0.068) (0.079) (0.075)
fall× u. first 0.117 −0.049 0.361∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.071 −0.122 −0.015 −0.044
(0.099) (0.099) (0.089) (0.089) (0.097) (0.091) (0.086) (0.102)
rise× u. first −0.142 0.001 0.013 0.108 −0.063 −0.028 0.092 −0.078
(0.107) (0.095) (0.082) (0.093) (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089)
fall× 2nd vig. 0.192∗ 0.011 −0.113 −0.122 0.292∗∗∗ 0.130 0.045 0.139
(0.100) (0.099) (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) (0.091) (0.085) (0.100)
rise× 2nd vig. −0.047 −0.042 0.049 0.111 −0.015 0.058 0.201∗∗ 0.082
(0.106) (0.095) (0.085) (0.092) (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089)
Joint F-tests.
u. first p = 0.007
2nd vig. p = 0.066
Observations 1,099 1,099 1,085 1,085 1,123 1,123 1,121 1,121
R2 0.164 0.086 0.059 0.010 0.040 0.018 0.033 0.059
Notes: This table provides an overview of vignette and question order effects on the forecasts. Panel A
uses data from Wave 1 of the expert sample. Panel B uses data from the general population sample.
∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment rate compared to the baseline scenario. ∆π
denotes the expected change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. u. first is an
indicator taking value one if a respondent first answered the unemployment forecast question and then
the inflation forecast question. 2nd vig. is an indicator taking value one if the forecast corresponds to
the second vignette that a respondent faced. Both panels report joint F-tests that result from Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with respondent-level clustered standard errors and test for overall zero
effects of u. first and 2nd vig. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10
pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A16: Robustness: Incentive effects
Panel A: Incentives
∆πX ∆uX bothX allX time
instructions
time vignettes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
incentives 0.044∗∗ −0.000 0.038∗∗ 0.022 −0.537 38.589∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (10.361) (13.236)
Constant 0.447∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 112.689∗∗∗ 165.001∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (9.261) (6.490)
Observations 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063
R2 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.008
Panel B: Incentives crossed with subjective perception of expert accuracy
∆πX ∆uX bothX all X time
instructions
time vignettes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
incentives 0.040∗ 0.001 0.038∗∗ 0.020 −1.128 38.692∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (10.555) (13.029)
exp. acc. 0.006 −0.015 0.012 −0.005 7.261 5.663
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (7.068) (4.976)
incentives× exp. acc. −0.017 −0.007 −0.029 −0.012 0.246 7.697
(0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (9.717) (17.501)
Constant 0.449∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 113.222∗∗∗ 165.118∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (9.502) (6.577)
Observations 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049
R2 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.010
Panel C: Incentives for the mechanism questions








Notes: This table provides an overview of the effect of monetary incentives on the response behavior of the general
population in Wave 1. A forecast is classified as benchmark-consistent if it follows the same qualitative direction as
the median expert forecast. Panel A displays the effect on the benchmark-consistency of forecasts and response times.
incentives constitutes a binary variable that takes value one for incentivized respondets. For each individual, ∆πXmeasures
the fraction of benchmark-consistent inflation forecasts (out of 2), ∆uXthe fraction of benchmark-consistent unemployment
forecasts (out of 2), bothXthe fraction of vignettes in which both forecasts are benchmark-consistent (out of 2), and
allXthe overall fraction of benchmark-consistent forecasts (out of 4). Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the
effect of incentives on the probability of a benchmark-consistent forecast. Columns 5 and 6 show effects on the time
spent reading the instructions and the total time spent on the vignettes. Panel B examines heterogeneity according to
the respondents’ perceived accuracy of experts (exp. acc., standardized) to rule out that incentives might be ineffective
merely because expert forecasts are perceived as inaccurate. Panel C studies the effect of incentives on response accuracy
to the mechanism propagation questions. total mechanism score denotes the standardized number of correctly answered
mechanism questions, time mechanism questions measures the time spent for answering the mechanism questions. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A17: Misperceived endogeneity of interest rate shock
Panel A: Binary monetary policy reaction
fed. funds rate
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fall −0.358∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.407∗∗∗ −0.054
(0.114) (0.087) (0.127) (0.098)
rise 0.164 0.249∗∗∗ 0.155 0.190
(0.100) (0.092) (0.118) (0.124)
fall×1(α > 0) 0.257∗ 0.216 0.017
(0.150) (0.147) (0.148)
rise×1(α > 0) 0.046 0.039 0.125
(0.128) (0.131) (0.128)
fall×1(β > 0) 0.071 0.145 0.066
(0.131) (0.145) (0.146)
rise×1(β > 0) −0.113 0.028 −0.144
(0.127) (0.126) (0.122)
Obs. 503 503 503 503
R2 0.039 0.020 0.041 0.022
Panel B: Expected monetary policy reaction
fed. funds rate
∆π ∆u ∆π ∆u
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fall −0.304∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.060
(0.080) (0.066) (0.081) (0.071)
rise 0.178∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.070) (0.071)
fall×α/4 0.860∗∗ 0.761∗∗ 0.526∗
(0.355) (0.334) (0.270)
rise×α/4 0.135 0.093 0.194
(0.230) (0.234) (0.249)
fall×β/4 0.061 0.234 −0.146
(0.285) (0.304) (0.266)
rise×β/4 −0.048 0.135 −0.114
(0.231) (0.262) (0.241)
Obs. 503 503 503 503
R2 0.052 0.018 0.054 0.026
Notes: This table reports regressions that test for misperception of the interest rate shock as an endogenous reaction of
the Fed to a changed outlook in inflation. α denotes the coefficient on πe in the Fed’s linear forward-looking interest
rate rule, and β denotes the coefficient on ue. ∆u denotes the expected change in the unemployment rate compared to
the baseline scenario. ∆π denotes the expected change in the inflation rate compared to the baseline scenario. Panel A
regresses both variables on 1(α > 0) – a dummy taking value one if the respondent believes that the Fed would increase
the federal funds target rate in response to an unexpected increase in the outlook for future inflation – and 1(β > 0) – a
dummy taking value one if the respondent believes that the Fed would increase the federal funds target rate in response
to an unexpected increase in the outlook for future unemployment. Panel B uses α and β which are the respondent’s
estimates of the coefficients in the forward-looking interest rate rule. They are divided by 4 because the inflation and
unemployment outlook change by 0.25 percentage points (rather than 1 pp.) in the survey questions. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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C Details on the derivation of the theoretical and
empirical benchmarks
In this section, we provide details on the sources, the assumptions, and calculations used
to turn the empirical and theoretical evidence on each shock into comparable multipliers,
as outlined in section 3.1. We use an Okun’s Law coefficient of -0.4, based on Ball et
al. (2017), which implies a 0.4 percentage point rise in unemployment associated to a 1
percent fall in output over the course of a year. Below, ∆y indicates a percent fall in
output over four quarters, and ∆π and ∆u are the respective four quarter changes of
inflation and the unemployment rate in percentage points.5 In each case, the following
five key steps are involved: 1) identifying the size of the shock in the source paper(s),
2) identifying the size of the response of the variables of interest in the source paper(s),
3) determining the size of the shock in the vignettes, 4) rescaling the shocks from the
source papers to be of the same size as those from the vignettes, 5) translating output
changes into unemployment changes when needed. All calculations contain a small degree
of approximation.
Oil price Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010) show that since 1984, a date conventionally con-
sidered as the beginning of the Great Moderation, the response of the US economy to oil
price fluctuations has become milder. We thus derive our benchmark from the authors’
post-1984 VAR results. As shown in Table 1, the benchmark unemployment rate change
for an oil price rise of $30 is 0.4 to 0.45 percentage points. For inflation, we derive an
empirical benchmark rise of 1.25 to 1.5 percentage points.
We choose two papers as theoretical references: Bodenstein et al. (2011) and Balke
and Brown (2018). Both papers model the effect of shocks to oil supply outside the
US. While the former paper models the US as a purely oil-importing country, the latter
treats the US as both oil-producing and oil-importing, providing us with a theoretical
benchmark effect ranging from 0.35 to 0.8 percentage points (see Table 1). Neither of
these papers studies the impact of oil supply shocks on domestic inflation.
5In the case of government and tax shocks in the model of Gaĺı et al. (2011), the responses of output
and unemployment exhibited very low persistence, likely due to the specification of the shock process
itself. We therefore opted for using the average change over for four quarters rather than the change in
the fourth quarter only.
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Oil price - Empirical Source: Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010), Figure 1, Panel B (i.e.
post-84). 1) Shock is 10% change in price. 2) ∆y = −0.2, ∆π = 0.25. 3) Size of shock in
vignette 55 percent (Wave 2) or 56 percent (Wave 1) so we approximately multiply the
original shocks by 5.5. 4) ∆y = −1.1 , ∆π = 1.4. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = 0.425.
Oil price - Theory Source: Bodenstein et al. (2011), Figure 2. 1) Shock is 8% change
in price 2) ∆y = −0.15. 3) Size of shock in vignette 55 percent (Wave 2) 56 percent
(Wave 1) so we approximately multiply the original shocks by 7. 4) ∆y = −1.05 5)
Okun’s Law: ∆u = 0.42.
Source: Balke and Brown (2018), Figure 3. 1) Shock is 2.5% change in price 2)
∆y = −0.1. 3) Size of shock in vignette 55 percent (Wave 2) 56 percent (Wave 1) so
we approximately multiply the original shocks by 22. 4) ∆y = −2.2 5) Okun’s Law:
∆u = 0.88.
Government spending Regarding government spending, the growing body of works
focusing narrowly on defense spending shocks (Auerbach et al., 2019; Basso and Rachedi,
2019; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014) would in theory constitute the optimal comparison
for the vignette. However, these studies compute fiscal multipliers at the local level
(e.g., metro area or state), which are not necessarily applicable to the national level.
We therefore refer to studies that examine the impact of spending at the national level
and that utilize the same methodologies (i.e., VAR models) as the papers we consider
for the other shocks. For the effect of government spending increases on unemployment,
we compute an empirical reference range of −0.1 to −0.2 percentage points (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Ramey, 2011). No results are
available for the effect on inflation. On the theoretical side, we interpret the exogenous
spending shock in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gaĺı et al. (2011) as a government
spending shock. A third source is the government spending shock in Zubairy (2014).6
The theoretical reference range of values for the change in unemployment after a rise in
spending of 0.5 percent of GDP, reported in Table 1, is between −0.1 to −0.2 percentage
points, while the benchmark rise in inflation is 0.15 to 0.2 percentage points.
6Note that we do not use this paper as a benchmark for the response of inflation. Although inflation
dynamics resulting from fiscal policy are embedded in the model, they are not discussed in detail by the
author.
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Government spending - Empirical Source: Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey
(2011) and sources therein, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). 1) Shock is 1% of GDP
2) ∆y = 0.8 to 1.5. 3) Size of shock in vignette is 2.4% of 4.2 trillion of government
spending. US 2018 GDP is 20.89 trillion according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
so the shock is about 2.4% of 20% of GDP, which is 0.5% of GDP. So we divide the
original shock by 2. 4) ∆y = 0.4 to 0.75. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = −0.16 to −0.3.
Government spending - Theory Source: Gaĺı et al. (2011), Figure 3. 1) Size of
shock is 0.47, with exogenous spending formulated in percent of output, so it can be
interpreted as 0.5% of GDP. 2) ∆u = −0.1, ∆π = 0.2. 3) The shock in the vignette is
very similar in size, so there is no need to scale it. 4) ∆u = −0.1, ∆π = 0.2.
Source: Smets and Wouters (2007), Figure 2. 1) Size of shock is 0.5, with exogenous
spending formulated in percent of output, so it can be interpreted as 0.5% of GDP. 2)
∆y = 0.3, ∆π = 0.15. 3) The shock in the vignette is very similar in size, so there is no
need to scale it. 4) ∆y = 0.3, ∆π = 0.15. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = −0.12.
Source: Zubairy (2014), Table 2. 1) Size of shock is 1% of GDP. 2) ∆y = 1. 3) Divide
by 2 to make it comparable to the vignette. 4) ∆y = 0.5. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = −0.2.
Monetary policy Arias et al. (2019) gives an empirical benchmark effect of 0.2 per-
centage points on unemployment and 0.2 percentage points on inflation for our federal
funds rate rise by 50 basis points. This is largely in line with a large and consistent
body of VAR evidence since the late 1990’s (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Bernanke et
al., 2005; Christiano et al., 1999; Primiceri, 2005; Romer and Romer, 2004; Stock and
Watson, 2001; Uhlig, 2005). As a theoretical reference, we again use Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Gaĺı et al. (2011) and arrive at a benchmark of 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points
for unemployment and a benchmark of -0.15 percentage points for inflation.
Monetary policy - Empirical Source: Arias et al. (2019) Figure 5 (i.e. estimation
on full post-WWII sample, imposing a zero restriction on the systematic response of
monetary policy to commodity prices). 1) Shock size is 0.25 percentage points. 2) ∆y =
−0.25, ∆π = −0.1. 3) To make the shock comparable to the vignette, we multiply by 2.
4) ∆y = −0.5, ∆π = −0.2. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = 0.2.
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Monetary policy - Theory Source: Gaĺı et al. (2011), Figure 3. 1) Size of shock is
0.15 percentage points 2) ∆u = −0.15, ∆π = −0.05. 3) We approximately multiply by
3.3 to make it comparable to the vignette. 4) ∆u = 0.5, ∆π = −0.16.
Source: Smets and Wouters (2007), Figure 2. 1) Size of shock is 0.175. 2) ∆y = −0.35,
∆π = −0.05. 3) We approximately multiply by 3 to make it comparable to the vignette.
4) ∆y = −1, ∆π = −0.15. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = 0.4.
Income tax rate The empirical benchmark for the unemployment change in response
to the increase in the income tax rate by 1 percentage point on average ranges between
0.2 and 0.6 percentage points (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Favero and Giavazzi, 2012;
Mertens and Ravn, 2012, 2014; Perotti, 2012; Romer and Romer, 2010). To our knowl-
edge, the only paper modeling the impact of labor income tax rate fluctuations in a
New Keynesian model is Zubairy (2014). For the theoretical benchmark of the effect on
unemployment, we derive a value of 0.06.7
Tax rate change - Empirical Source: Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and
Romer (2010), Favero and Giavazzi (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2012, 2014), and Perotti
(2012). 1) Shock size is a 1 percent of GDP increase in tax revenue. 2) Range of empirical
output multipliers at 4 to 6 quarters is 1 to 3 percent of GDP. 3) The shock size in the
vignette is approximately 0.5 percent of GDP. So we divide by 2 to make the shock
comparable to the vignette. 4) ∆y = 0.5 to 1.5. 5) Okun’s Law: 0.2 to 0.6.
Tax rate change - Theory Source: Zubairy (2014), Table 2. 1) Size of shock is 1
percent of GDP. 2) ∆y = 0.32. 3) Divide by 2 to make it comparable to the vignette. 4)
∆y = 0.15. 5) Okun’s Law: ∆u = −0.06.
7Once again, we do not use this paper as a benchmark for the response of inflation. Although inflation
dynamics resulting from fiscal policy are embedded in the model, they are not discussed in detail by the
author.
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D Details on the First-Order Conditions Impulse Re-
sponse Functions
This exercise examines how the representative household’s expectations of its optimal
consumption and labor supply decisions differ from the rational-expectations general-
equilibrium solution when its expectations for inflation and unemployment in response
to a monetary shock resemble those we observe in the survey. The FOC IRFs that we
compute should be interpreted neither as an equilibrium dynamic nor as the household’s
actual response to a monetary shock. Instead, their interpretation is that of an intended
path for future consumption and labor supply formulated once the household observes
the monetary shock. The implicit assumption is that the household expects all the en-
dogenous variables to react as in the rational-expectations model except for inflation and
unemployment (and the real wage markup, which is directly pinned down by unemploy-
ment).
The steps of the exercise are as follows.
1. Solve the Gaĺı et al. (2011) model through a first-order perturbation method (e.g.,
with the Dynare toolbox) and compute the IRFs to the monetary policy shock.
2. Rescale all the IRFs to make them consistent with the size of the shock in the
vignette. The standard deviation of the shock in the model is 0.21 percentage
points while in the vignette it is 0.5. As the model is linear, this simply changes
the magnitude of the deviations from the steady state implied by the IRFs.
3. Rebase the IRFs of inflation and unemployment to have the same value as the mean
household expectation from the vignette at a horizon of four quarters, assuming
that the overall path shape stays the same. In other words, we “force” the IRFs
of inflation and unemployment to pass through the black cross marks in the upper
panels of Figure 5.
4. Use the relevant equations to recompute the household’s optimal consumption and
labor supply from time 0 (when the shock hits) until the final period of the IRFs.
These equations are the household’s first-order conditions for consumption (Euler
equation) and labor supply and the model equations linking unemployment and
inflation to the relevant state variables for the household’s decision (wage markup
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equation). The resulting values constitute the First-Order Conditions IRFs (lower
panel of Figure 5).
The details of the full model are in Gaĺı et al. (2011). We use the same parameter
values as the estimated modes of the posterior distribution from the original paper. To
make it clear that the relevant equations are solved as expectations at time 0 (i.e. when the
shock is realized), we denote them with an e superscript. For instance, ret represents the
time-0 expected nominal interest rate for time t under rational expectations. Meanwhile,
we use a tilde to denote expectations that follow those we observe in the survey or
the expectations of the households’ choice variables (e.g., π̃et and c̃
e
t for inflation and
consumption, respectively).
The Euler equation (with habits) is used to solve for the consumption IRFs. In
practical terms, we compute ct using the household’s expectations rather than the ra-
tional expectations IRF for inflation. Note that for the nominal interest rate we keep
the rational-expectations IRF as in the model because we did not measure households’
















where h is a habit parameter (adjusted for trend growth).
The relevant equations for computing labor supply factor in the expected inflation
through the consumption-labor preference smoother zt and the effect of the unemployment
rate on the real wage markup. Gaĺı et al. (2011) describe zt as a“consumption externality”:
when consumption rises, the marginal disutility from work also falls.

















Labor supply (nt) is pinned down by the usual first-order condition equalizing the real
wage received by the household and marginal rate of substitution between consumption
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t − φñet − z̃et . (6)
32
E Details on wave 1 of the expert survey
We compiled a list of participants of the following conferences:
• SITE Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Volatility (2018, 2017, 2016)
• SITE Macroeconomics and Inequality (2018)
• Cowles Macro Conference (2018, 2017, 2016)
• NBER Annual Conference on Macroeconomics (2018, 2017, 2016)
• ifo Conference on “Macroeconomics and Survey Data” (2018, 2017, 2016)
• Venice Summer Institute on Expectation Formation (2018)
• Workshop on Subjective Expectations NY Fed (2016)
We also recruited a sample of graduate students in macroeconomics from the following
institutions:
• University of Bonn
• Goethe University Frankfurt
• University of Oxford
Finally, we also recruited a sample of economists from the following policy institutions:
• The Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.
• The International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
• Bank for International Settlements, Basel
• Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt
• European Central Bank, Frankfurt
• ifo centre, Munich
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Below is a list of the institutions that our experts (from Wave 1) have as one of
their main institutions: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Uni-
versity of Cologne, Haverford College, University of Minnesota, Ross School of Busi-
ness, University of Michigan, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, University of Amsterdam,
Boston University, Questrom School of Business, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Goethe University Frankfurt, LMU Munich, University of Notre Dame, University of
California San Diego, University of Oxford, Temple University, International Monetary
Fund, University of Toronto, Carleton University, Yale University, Federal Reserve Board,
University of Copenhagen, University of Bologna, Georgia Institute of Technology At-
lanta, Statistics Norway, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt School of Finance & Manage-
ment, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Brandeis University, Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, Bank of England, MIT Sloan School of Management, Rand Corporation,
University of Copenhagen, International Monetary Fund, Swiss National Bank, Boston
College, University of Reading, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School, Bonn Graduate
School of Economics, Institute for Employment Research Friedrich-Alexander Univer-
sity (FAU) Erlangen-Nuremberg, College of Business Clemson University, ifo Institute
Munich, Stockholm University, Banque de France, University of Nantes, Uppsala Uni-
versity, World Bank, University of St.Gallen, Austrian Institute of Economic Research,
Copenhagen Business School, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, NYU Stern School
of Busines, University of Bonn, Mannheim University, University of Manchester, Uni-
versity College London, University of Lausanne, Arizona State University, University of
Birmingham, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, European Central Bank, Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, Basel, University of Maryland, Amsterdam School of Economics,
Columbia University, Christian Albrechts University at Kiel, Princeton University, Stock-
holm School of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, University
of Warwick, Leibniz University Hannover, University of Heidelberg, University of Copen-
hagen, Northwestern University, New York University, Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, Indiana University, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
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